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ABSTRACT

“BOOT CAMP FOR THE PSYCHE”: INOCULATIVE NONFICTION AND PRE-MEMORY
STRUCTURES AS PREEMPTIVE TRAUMA MEDIATION IN FICTION AND FILM

Jacob M. Hodgen
Department of English
Master of Arts

While some theorists have hinted at various social functions served by the gothic
genre—such as providing an outlet for grief, anxiety, and violence in their various
forms—recent research within the last few decades into sociology, military science, and
trauma studies supplies compelling new ways of rereading the horror genre. In addition
to providing an outlet for grief, anxiety, and violence in their various forms, horror
media can now be read as a preemptive measure in an effort to mediate the immediate
and long-term effects of the trauma and horror faced by humanity. I argue that in much
the same way an author may write a self-help tract such as The Gift of Fear to try and
inform women how to repel a sexual predator by graphically relating harrowing tales of
sexual predation, so do some horror texts and film claim to preemptively mediate
different types of trauma before, during, and after it occurs. This is done in each case
not by merely scaring readers, but by inoculating them against them against future
debilitating trauma before, during, and after it may occur. The relatively recent (or at
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least recently popularized) genre of self-help books that overtly seeks to prepare its
audience for future trauma by exposing them to it in a controlled environment draws
upon the canon of gothic literature for its inspiration as well as for its rhetorical
strategies and literary devices. Without discounting the aesthetics and the utility of
horror as a psychological outlet, I will show that gothic media can be reread and
reconfigured within this new framework. By realigning horror studies within the
framework of trauma studies and the possibility for inoculation against future trauma,
this study will provide new insight into one how popular culture often portrays trauma
through text, and I will seek to establish a new category affiliated with both trauma
theory and horror, the study and representation of pre-memory. This thesis will also
present as a case study the rhetorical self-inoculation of American horror author H.P.
Lovecraft.
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“Kids who are in a much more chaotic state of mind and life than most adults
remember or realize, they can go into these [horror films] as kind of boot camps for the
psyche, as I have said. Strengthening their egos, strengthening their sense of fortitude;
just as a soldier comes, you know, from momma’s arms into the drill instructor’s gaze
and ends hardened, but feeling like he can survive battle. I think that’s, in a sense, what
goes on with kids that go to scary movies. And it’s something that the grownups never
seem to think about; they’re always worried about, ‘Oh, the kids have been damaged,
the kids have been traumatized.’ It’s always been kind of the basis for my sort of
optimism about what I do, and of being kind of a right thing, because the kids feel
spontaneously grateful for it, even if it gives them nightmares, there’s something going
on there that is needed.”
—Wes Craven (2000)
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORIZING TRAUMA INOCULATION
“He had probably been watching her for a while. We aren’t sure—but what we
do know is that she was not his first victim. [. . .] She closed the door behind her,
pushing it until she heard it latch. She is certain she locked it, which means he must
have already been inside the door” (de Becker Gift 1). This unsettling narrative details
the sinister account of rape and attempted murder of Kelly, a naïve yet likeable twentysomething who barely escapes with her life. The dialogue is filled with tears and terror,
and the tale is deliberately designed to elicit a powerful emotional response from its
audience. Kelly’s narrative is so compelling, in fact, that the book containing the
account of her ordeal became an international commercial success, though not in the
way you might think. Kelly’s story is similar to thousands of other horror genre pieces,
yet this passage is not from a teen stalker film, nor is it text from a thriller novel; this is
the introduction from a self-help book designed to teach the public how to defend
themselves from violence.
In recent years, much of the academic inquiry regarding horror fiction and film
focused on trying to define its existence and appeal to mass audiences. Many
reactionary critics continually rail against the genre, citing it as the causative agent for
criminals, violence, and sexual deviancy. Other camps argue the opposite: that horror
may serve to placate the primitive urges of the id, provide social catharsis, or reinforce
morality by delimiting deviancy. However, historically speaking, horror’s raison d’être
goes beyond merely attempting to scare or entertain, and scholarship surrounding
horror studies often neglects to address what is arguably one of the genre’s original and
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primary purposes as a highly pragmatic pedagogical mechanism. This resistance is likely
due to the fact that many academics are hesitant to write about issues of supposed
didacticism that may chafe against personal interpretations of a supposed postmodern
aesthetic. As horror studies finally climbs its way out of a lengthy phase of recuperation,
many zealous scholars, who have scrabbled for decades in a quest for legitimacy, are
loath to do anything they worry may cheapen their work. Kelly’s deliberately didactic
tale of terror complicates this current methodology and demands that scholars do not
fail to account for the rising number of horrific texts specifically designed to teach
audiences.
Inoculative Nonfiction
In Gavin de Becker’s instructional text, The Gift of Fear (1997), Kelly’s thoroughly
sensationalized account of shocking terror suggests that scholars must reconcile current
understandings of trauma and horror as merely aesthetic escapism or social catharsis
with its pragmatic pedagogical potential. Defying attempts at literary categorization,
Kelly’s story shows that horror fiction and film need to be reevaluated to take into
account the consideration that “real life” trauma can be mediated by text. While some
theorists have hinted at various social functions served by the gothic genre1—such as
providing an outlet for grief, anxiety, and violence in their various forms—recent
research within the last few decades into sociology, military science, and trauma studies
supplies compelling new ways of rereading the horror genre. In addition to providing an
1

This study will, as does Matt Hills in The Pleasures of Horror, conflate the terms “gothic” and “horror” to
deliberately depart from the longstanding tradition of academe that privileges the former term as “high
art” and treats the latter as a pejorative.
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outlet for grief, anxiety, and violence in their various forms, horror media can now be
read as a preemptive measure in an effort to mediate the immediate and long-term
effects of the trauma and horror faced by humanity. I argue that in much the same way
an author may write a self-help tract such as The Gift of Fear to try and inform women
how to repel a sexual predator by graphically relating harrowing tales of sexual
predation, so do some horror texts and film claim to preemptively mediate different
types of trauma before, during, and after it occurs. This is done in each case not by
merely scaring readers, but by inoculating them against them against future debilitating
trauma before, during, and after it may occur. The relatively recent (or at least recently
popularized) genre of self-help books that overtly seeks to prepare its audience for
future trauma by exposing them to it in a controlled environment draws upon the canon
of gothic literature for its inspiration as well as for its rhetorical strategies and literary
devices. Without discounting the aesthetics and the utility of horror as a psychological
outlet, I will show that gothic media can be reread and reconfigured within this new
framework. By realigning horror studies within the framework of trauma studies and
the possibility for inoculation against future trauma, this study will provide new insight
into one how popular culture often portrays trauma through text and I will seek to
establish a new category affiliated with both trauma theory and horror, the study and
representation of pre-memory.
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Even though Stephen King labeled Clive Barker “the future of horror” in 19842,
current historical trends suggest that this title may have come prematurely. Though the
staples of westernized horror—maniacs, monsters, witchcraft, etc.—have certainly not
been discarded by contemporary culture, a much more likely candidate of the future of
popular horror consumption is the realm of interdisciplinarianism. The nascent genre of
self-help books that seek to prepare readers for future trauma by exposing them to it—
which I will hereafter call inoculative nonfiction—presents a new, interdisciplinaryminded stage in the evolution of the gothic text. Following on the tails of its
commercially successful frontrunners, Gavin de Becker and Dave Grossman, aspiring
authors from a wide variety of backgrounds and writing ability are trying their hand at
inoculative nonfiction. Though predominantly featuring those with military, law
enforcement, or martial arts experience, the canon is rapidly growing and gaining
credence in the world of pop-psychology.3 This chapter will seek to introduce the
concept of inoculative nonfiction and reconcile it with current understandings of trauma
theory and horror studies, chapter two will specifically address and analyze inoculative
nonfiction as a genre at length, and chapter three will examine an instance of literary
self-inoculation.

2

After Stephen King read Barker’s Books of Blood (1984) he claimed, “I have seen the future of horror and
its name is Clive Barker” which became the text’s official dustcover endorsement.
3
Oprah claimed The Gift of Fear is, “the most important book I have ever read” (Charlie Rose) and
crowned de Becker “the nation’s leading expert on violent behavior” (de Becker, Gift, Back Cover).
Though her endorsement is perhaps dubious in the eyes of seasoned critics, Oprah Winfrey’s praise of The
Gift of Fear certainly helped de Becker maintain its position on various bestseller lists and place his books
in millions of home around the world.
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Inoculative nonfiction employs a common strategy throughout the majority of its
canon: graphic, gripping narrative is presented with ample portions of blood and terror,
and is then followed by careful exposition and analysis. Indeed, all of the stories have a
specific pedagogical function. While the goal of the narrative’s overt didacticism is not
related to conventional morality or ethics, the premise of these texts revolves around
informing the reader how to better prepare for future violence and hopefully mediates
future trauma by textually inoculating against it. Upon reading, one cannot help but
notice the stylistic similarities between these self-help books and similarly-themed
gothic texts: both rely on hyper-dramatic representation to shock and frighten their
audience. Theorist Linda Holland-Toll defines horror as “any text which has extreme or
supernatural elements, induces (as its primary intention and/or effect) strong feelings of
terror, horror, or revulsion in the reader, and generates a significant amount of
unresolved dis/ease within the reader” (6). Holland-Toll’s description presents a near
perfect summary for inoculative nonfiction as well: its primary purpose is to instill
extreme amounts of fear and revulsion, and does so for the explicit purpose of seeking
to preemptively mediate future exposure to trauma.
This chapter will seek to avoid several of the pedestrian pitfalls associated with
horror studies, and to do so I will draw from the disclaimer offered by Matt Hills in The
Pleasures of Horror (2005), which successfully negotiates several similar methodological
problems. First, this study must refrain from essentializing horror texts as having “an
inevitably mimetic relation between fiction and its viewers” (3), as this overly simplistic
methodology—commonly adopted by reactionary media figures—tends unproductively
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to end in pathologizing the reader and author. Equally fruitless is the practice of
quantizing audience response and textual intentionality, and neither will any attempt be
made to rank the authenticity of a set of traumatic events or narrowly define what can
be called horror: “horror's pleasures *. . .+ can only be accessed culturally—that is, made
sense of, reported, discussed, claimed, disavowed—through grids and templates of
meaning or ‘discursive practices’” (xii). What I will examine is how these authors claim
that horror acts performatively to modify perceptions and behaviors in various people
by varying degrees, which can be illustrated most clearly in the case of inoculative nonfiction. I will contextualize my project within various frameworks from the fields of both
horror and trauma studies in an attempt to discursively reconcile previous scholarship
and establish how we can now read inoculative nonfiction as a new stage in the
evolution of the gothic text.
Inoculative Nonfiction and Horror
One of the most useful places to begin examining horror’s pedagogic potential is
to analyze and problematize a significant distinction made by Nöel Carroll between
“natural horror” and “art-horror.” Carroll claims that natural horror is similar to the
experience of being chased through the woods by a bear; the attendant fear will likely
produce a common set of psychological and physiological reactions that we commonly
associate with fear and panic. By contrast, “art-horror” is the experience of watching a
film or reading a book about being chased through the woods by a bear. Carroll further
claims that horror texts tend to elicit a similar effect on their audiences; the compelling
nature of this simulated danger may evoke symptoms that closely imitate the fear and
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revulsion associated with genuine danger: terror, shivers, goose-bumps, nausea,
screaming, and so forth.
For Carroll, horror typically art-horrifies audiences through the exhibition of
monstrosity in several forms; that which is threatening or disgusting triggers an
emotional response that echoes, but does not fully achieve, the psychological and
physiological effects of natural horror. As examples, Carroll points specifically to entities
which are interstitial or culturally designated as impure: the wolf-man is a categorical
anomaly; the slimy monster reminds us of our feces, which generates revulsion.
However, regardless of the nature of the monster involved, an audience’s response to
art-horror is necessarily different from natural horror, claims Carroll, since the audience
inherently realizes that what they see on a movie screen or read in a book is fictitious.
In something akin to voyeurism, the realm of art-horror lies within the perceptions of
the audience. Whereas an audience may describe a Dracula-inspired film as “spinetingling” and experience a very real emotional response, no one in the audience actually
thinks Dracula is real and runs screaming out of the theater for fear of attack, and nor
does the audience need to pretend Dracula is real to feel terror at the film:
saying we are art-horrified by Dracula means we are horrified by the
thought of Dracula where the thought of such a possible being does not
commit us to a belief in his existence. Here, the thought of Dracula, the
thing that art-horrifies me, is not the event of my thinking of Dracula but
the content of the thought, viz., that Dracula, a threatening and impure
being of such and such dimensions, might exist and do these terrible
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things, nor need it be assumed that I am reflexively aware of the content
of my thought. Dracula is presented onscreen and I am art-horrified by
the prospect that there could be such a being perpetrating such deeds.
(“Nature of Horror” 56)
Carroll’s distinction between real and simulated horror is valuable, and, in most cases, is
quite useful as a sociological marker. However, contemporary evolutions of the gothic
genre problematize this line as not only cloudy, but as one where extensive slippage
occurs between the two. Audiences cannot always tell the difference between art and
natural horror4, and many texts are now explicitly designed to conflate the two5.
Inoculative nonfiction can be read in two primary ways: either it occupies a
liminal territory between any categorization of natural and art-horror, or it occupies
both spaces simultaneously. As a print medium, de Becker’s audience realizes that the
threat felt by Kelly during her rape is not a threat to them. Even though the book is
based on “real” (natural horror) events, not only does the story indicate the attacker has
already been convicted and confined, but readers ostensibly consume the book while in
the safety of their own locked and otherwise safe homes. Kelly’s ordeal thus arthorrifies the audience; shock, revulsion, goose-bumps, and nausea may accompany its
reading, depending on the emotional state of the reader. However, it is not the author’s

4

Children are an obvious example, as they may not be able to distinguish between fantasy and reality.
Thus, either there may not be any difference between art-horror and natural horror for children, or arthorror simply does not exist for them as a static category.
5

The commercially successful style of cinéma-vérité filmmaking creates films that often go to great
lengths to spuriously “prove” their authenticity. Horror films that adopt this style include The Blair Witch
Project (1999) and the more recent Cloverfield (2008).
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intent to merely art-horrify the audience; de Becker wants the trauma to be real
enough—that is, as similar to natural horror as he can successfully achieve—that his
reader can empathize strongly enough with the characters in the text to actually
experience some sense of “real” trauma themselves. Unlike some horror texts where
the author intends the audience to undergo only a momentary shudder of art-horror
and then return to life as normal, inoculative nonfiction seeks to make the trauma of the
text permanent: de Becker wants his readers to become emotionally scarred just
enough so they consume the book not merely as artifice, but as a “real” event that is
accessible in the future to them as experience. The more “real,” or natural, inoculative
nonfiction becomes to the reader, then, theoretically, the more potent the inoculation
against future trauma. Just as young couples are counseled to watch childbirth
education videos, which hospitals design to be extreme in their depictions of the horrors
of what is almost sure to be a loud, painful, and slimy episode of vaginal birth well
before the due-date, so does inoculative nonfiction seek to pre-mediate the future
trauma of its particular brand of violence through a controlled, yet no less graphic,
viewing.
Inoculative Nonfiction and Trauma Studies
One way of illustrating the mechanics of inoculative nonfiction is to examine
some of the more prominent methodologies for interpreting trauma. As a first casestudy, we will gaze back through trauma studies to one its earlier theorists. Published in
1757, Edmund Burke’s “A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin or Our Ideas of the
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Sublime and Beautiful” establishes a basic vocabulary for the fascination of that which is
terrible.
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that
is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible
objects, or operates is a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the
sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind
is capable of feeling. I say strongest emotion because I am satisfied the
ideas of pain are much more powerful than those which enter on the part
of pleasure. (499)
The significance of the Burkean notion of the sublime is that it successfully creates a
terminology that begins to articulate and define experiences that are not entirely
understandable. The sublime, as differentiated from the beautiful and the picturesque,
is something that initiates a failure of comprehension, and primarily corresponds within
the category of art(horror). An encounter with the sublime elicits such strong emotions
because the psyche is not prepared to deal with the overwhelming nature of the
experience it is being presented with: past experience can provide no suitable
comparison, and language fails to offer a means of enunciation. More than the
unknown, the sublime is something which is indescribable, ineffable, and seemingly
unknowable and is a metaphor other theorists frequently employ to describe the
mechanism of trauma. Inoculative nonfiction operates with the same apparatus in mind.
The author designs the Inoculative text to provide a system of enunciation and historical
precedent for future traumatic events that may occur. By labeling and generating—at

Hodgen 11

least to the degree art-horror one can experienced as natural horror—what is
essentially a dark future encounter with the sublime, inoculative nonfiction seeks to
preemptively mediate the event by vaccinating the reader with a contrived, yet still
terrifying, experience. Though the sublime is, by definition, unknowable, by seeking to
accustomize the reader to its inscrutability the text hopes to tame some of the
potentially negative side effects of a future encounter.
Next, trauma theorists have yet to escape reckoning with Sigmund Freud (Leys
11). Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle marks one of the first significant attempts at
mapping a “psychic disorder that appears to reflect the unavoidable and overwhelming
imposition of historical events on the psyche” (Caruth 58). While initially shrugged off
by many physicians, the advent of World War I and the widely documented phenomena
of “shell shock” and “combat hysteria”—due to the intense trauma of modernized, and
more specifically, trench warfare—led to a wider interest of the diagnosis of what Freud
called Nachträglichkeit (Leys 22). Nachträglichkeit, or “deferred action” trauma, is the
relationship between two experiences separated by time. The original experience that
generates the wound becomes traumatic when compulsively triggered at a later time.
The patient reexperiences the memory of the original event, but now with the added
negative significance of trauma. Trauma, then, is a “dialectic between two events” and
exhibits a delay or latency where the past event is now only available “by a deferred act
of understanding and interpretation” (Leys 20). Dominick LaCapra calls this deferment a
“dissociation between cognition and affect” and claims that “ in traumatic experience
one typically can represent numbly or with aloofness what one cannot feel, and one
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feels overwhelmingly what one is unable to represent, at least with any critical distance
or control” (117).
Returning to a model similar to the Burkean sublime, unlike a typical neurosis in
which the patient merely avoids pain or conflict, the traumatic flashback “can only be
understood as the absolute inability of the mind to avoid an unpleasant event that has
not been given psychic meaning in any way” (Caruth 59). This moment of trauma is not
a direct reaction to the original experience of trauma, but is the enigma presented by
the patient’s survival of the event (Caruth 60). The degree of the trauma to the patient
is not caused by any quantity of antagonistic stimulus, but by “fright,” which is the
consequence of psychological lack of preparation to an overwhelming stimulus that
comes too quickly (Caruth 62).
We may, I think, tentatively venture to regard the common neurosis as a
consequence of an extensive breach being made in the protective shield
against stimuli. [. . .] Fright [is] caused by lack of any preparedness for
anxiety. [. . .] It will be seen, then, that preparedness for anxiety and the
hypercathexis of the receptive systems constitute the last line of defense
of the shield against the stimuli. (Freud Beyond the Pleasure Principle 3536)
Essentially what Freud argues here is that without proper mental conditioning,
the psyche is unable to fully comprehend certain moments of trauma in a satisfactory
manner. The original moment is not traumatic itself; it is the psyche’s inability to deal
with the moment that causes trauma at a later time. As a result of this, memories of the
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past experience are later triggered causing traumatic repetition, often in the form of
flashbacks or nightmares. This explains, at least in part, why Freud’s soldiers exhibited
the greatest amount of traumatic symptoms only after they have returned home to
their normal lives (Caruth 63).
Dreams occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of
repeatedly bringing the patient back into the situation of his accident, a
situation from which he wakes up in another fright. This astonishes
people far too little. [. . .] I am not aware, however, that patients
suffering from traumatic neurosis are much occupied in their waking lives
with memories of their accident. Perhaps they are more concerned with
not thinking of it. Anyone who accepts it as something self-evident that
their dreams should put them back at night into the situation that caused
them to fall ill has misunderstood the nature of dreams. (11-12)
It is this notion of traumatic repetition that explains the bulk of Kelly’s continued
anguish long after the incident occurred.
In The Gift of Fear, Kelly ostensibly suffered recurring nightmares and worse as
symptoms of her attack. As de Becker maneuvers Kelly through her encounter and posttraumatic stress disorder, he seeks to provide meaning and language for her ordeal,
thus ostensibly reducing the need for the past event to rupture violently into the
present as neuroses. However, in terms of trauma inoculation for the reader, whether
or not de Becker helps Kelly with her problems is entirely irrelevant. De Becker’s
primary purpose is to fortify the reader’s psyche against “a breach being made in the
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protective shield against stimuli”; the inoculative text aims to prepare for future anxiety
by preemptively exposing the reader to anxiety vicariously through Kelly. The reader,
unlike Kelly, has the “critical distance and control” needed to potentially accomplish this
feat with minimal psychic damage. The inoculation comes not only from the reader’s
encounter with Kelly’s story, but, more importantly, from the author’s exposition and
analysis of the events, both implicit and explicit. If Kelly’s current trauma is based on a
compulsive irruption of an incomprehensible memory of a past event into the present,
then de Becker can identify what systems of enunciation and forms of signification are
needed for Kelly’s recuperative therapy and offer them, in advance, to his reader. The
inoculation reduces the possibility of a failure of comprehension, since the act of
violence is more familiar and has historical precedence. Theoretically, the reader’s mind
now has little, or at least less, need for “repeatedly bringing [itself] back into the
situation of [its] accident, a situation from which [the subject] wakes up in another
fright,” should a similar attack occur. This is because the reader has a point of entry
through which to vicariously deal with this scripted encounter with the dark sublime
while awake and, at least to some extent, while ready for it.
LaCapra call this process “working-through” trauma, which involves the
establishment of various counterforces to combat any actual or potential compulsive
repetition of the traumatic event. If trauma is the involuntary irruption of the perceived
past into the present, then working-through seeks to prepare the mind for future
psychic incursions. Since trauma cannot be erased or healthily repressed, victims can
only learn to anticipate the symptoms of trauma and “learn how to live better with its
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attendant anxiety” (119). While LaCapra primarily focuses on the prospects of workingthrough as a strategy for the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder, the implicit
assumption of inoculative nonfiction is that it presents the possibility for the completion
of the process of working-through in advance, before a potentially traumatizing event
occurs. The counterforces against future trauma become vocabulary and vicarious
experience, and the reader learns to live with attendant anxiety before it ever happens.
It is important to note that none of this suggests that violence should or even can be
banalized to the point that the act becomes trivial. Kelly’s rape would surely be a
terrible experience no matter what mental preparations were made. What inoculative
nonfiction does suggest is that violence can, to at least some varying degree, be
prepared for, and the chance of an event turning into future traumatic neuroses can be
psychologically minimized or averted.
As E. Ann Kaplan points out, the utility of understanding how audiences can
experience trauma second-hand is at a premium in our modern, information-rich society:
“Most of us generally encounter trauma vicariously through the media rather than
directly. Since such exposure may result in symptoms of secondary trauma, we need to
know as much as possible about the process” (87). For example, Kaplan suggests that
films that produce vicarious trauma—which, to some degree, is all film—can create a
kind of “belatedness of response”; viewers become scarred by viewing disturbing
images for which they are not prepared and often demonstrate aversion to viewing
comparable images in the future (91). Similarly, a memory, like Kaplan’s notion of
traumatic film, is a set of vicariously experienced visual and emotional stimuli that can

Hodgen 16

create belated responses of trauma. Thus, according to this logic, all trauma is
experienced vicariously. LaCapra points out that since trauma is based on a
misrecognition or failure of the victim’s system of signification, the memory that
generates a traumatic episode is inevitably but a twisted distortion of the actual event
and not a reccurrence of any actual event (116). In sense, all trauma is a form of
“postmemory,” which is “the acquired memory of those not directly experiencing an
event” (108). Therefore, Kelly does not reexperience the event of her rape as trauma,
but it is a distorted memory of the event that forms her recurring nightmares; she
vicariously relives her own experience through a dubious memory, as this is her only
access to the “real” historical event of her rape. Memory’s representations of trauma—
like representations in fiction, nonfiction, or film—are authentic in the sense that the
pain they create is very real, yet the event they purport to relive does not exist as
presented. Inoculative nonfiction, then, seeks not to deal with postmemory, but to
preemptively create what can be called a “pre-memory”: the acquired memory of those
not directly experiencing an event but anticipate it may happen in the future.
Pre-memory has several popular homologues other than inoculation, such as the
terms desensitization and conditioning, and it seems important at this point to attempt
to draw some distinction between them. Medicine and psychology both use
desensitization in conjunction with various treatments, such as graduated exposure
therapy for the treatment of anxiety. However, as a pejorative term, desensitization is
wielded most often by propagandists and, outside the realm of pitchfork-toting censors,
seems to have little place in this study. Accustomization to something, even violence
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and trauma, does not automatically demand a dulling of the senses or morals, as is
often connoted in the lay usage of the term desensitization. For example, repeated
readings of Kelly’s account of violence does not necessarily equate with a diminished
sensibility for the pain of rape as it occurs; however, inoculative nonfiction suggests that
once thoroughly inoculated, one may be more likely to be able to successfully deal with
its trauma in the future, should a similar situation arise6. The term conditioning,
however, proves much more portentous, as it conjures both psychology and military
science in a productive manner. Athletes may condition their bodies to increase future
performance; soldiers and police officers condition themselves to be able to kill in future
combat situations; de Becker’s readers are conditioned—he hopes—to be able to avoid
making life-threatening mistakes in a situation of violence and better deal with future
trauma, should violence occur. Conditioning, then, works for our usage, as it connotes a
preemptive process of mediation.
Horror and Inoculative Nonfiction
Earlier in my argument I claim that inoculative nonfiction is the next stage in the
evolution of the gothic text, and now that I have established a theoretical framework
within trauma studies, I can begin to tackle this assertion through a thematic reverse
engineering. Syllogistically, the connection is as follows: inoculative nonfiction uses the
tropes of horror to expose its audience to trauma and violence, and it shows that
exposure to trauma and violence mediates future behavior; thus, the tropes of horror

6

Chapter two explains the precise mechanics of this strategy and provides examples of its perceived
efficacy.
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can be read to mediate future behavior. Since the tropes of horror mediate future
behavior, and the horror genre relies on these tropes by definition, then the horror
genre too mediates future behavior. Suggesting that inoculative nonfiction can be read
as horror is simple; De Becker consciously borrows stylistically from the tropes of horror
in order to elicit a powerful emotional response, and The Gift of Fear practically begs for
the comparison as it loudly proclaims on its back cover that it is “A HOW-TO BOOK THAT
READS LIKE A THRILLER” (see chapter two). However, critics may question the degree to
which a horror text, particularly a seemingly gratuitous text, can possibly inoculate its
audience. Is the endless repetition of horror tropes in fiction and film a pedagogical
phenomenon, and do audiences really become inoculated against anything useful by
watching episode X of a given slasher film franchise? These questions are perhaps best
answered by one of the more popular purveyors of contemporary horror. In an
unscripted interview for the documentary The American Nightmare (2000), Wes Craven
describes his filmmaking ideology:
Kids who are in a much more chaotic state of mind and life than most
adults remember or realize, they can go into these [horror films] as kind
of boot camps for the psyche, as I have said. Strengthening their egos,
strengthening their sense of fortitude; just as a soldier comes, you know,
from momma’s arms into the drill instructor’s gaze and ends hardened,
but feeling like he can survive battle. I think that’s, in a sense, what goes
on with kids that go to scary movies. And it’s something that the
grownups never seem to think about; they’re always worried about, “Oh,
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the kids have been damaged, the kids have been traumatized.” It’s
always been kind of the basis for my sort of optimism about what I do,
and of being kind of a right thing, because the kids feel spontaneously
grateful for it, even if it gives them nightmares, there’s something going
on there that is needed.
Craven’s tremendously successful Scream franchise provides an excellent
example of how horror operates in an inoculative function. The basic and largely
familiar premise of Scream and its sequels is that of a masked killer stalking a group of
teenagers. However, unlike most other slasher films, both Craven’s protagonists and
villains are exceptionally well-versed in the canon of modern horror. They have seen all
the traditional horror films, are aware of the major horror texts, and typically know
what sorts of things not to do; they are richly steeped in what Hills calls “intertextual
subcultural capital” (182). This intertextual capital allows them the possibility of
avoiding the same mistakes made by the protagonists of their similarly stalked filmic
predecessors.
In the neo-stalker film humorous self-referentiality gives way to serious
reflexivity. The protagonists of these films grow up to attain sober
recognition of their plight; there is a moment from “Wow! This is like one
of those stalker movies!” to ‘Shit! We are in one of those stalker
movies!” Those who refuse to get “self-reflexive,” or who do so too late,
die horribly. (qtd. in Hills 187, emphasis his)
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Scream privileges those with intertextual awareness and punishes those who do not
possess it with death. Intertextual (sub)cultural capital, of course, is also homologous
with pre-memory; those who do well in Scream are both knowledgeable of violence and
pre-conditioned from consuming conventional horror media to better deal with it
before, during, and after it occurs—or at least better able to understand their failure as
it occurs. The characters have not ever previously been stalked themselves, but they
know better how to act and respond to their predicament from having watched a
stalker in a movie; their increased potential for survival lies in the fact that they have
vicariously experienced the trauma to which they are currently exposed. The horror
films that provide the basis for the mediation of their trauma are usually lowbrow and
gratuitous, yet still prove to be not only useful, but essential to the characters’ survival.
While some may argue that Craven wrote Scream as a shameless self-promotion—he
claims to be personally invested in the notion that horror movies contain some greater
worth other than mere entertainment value—yet the fact that the popularity of selfreflexive horror films continues to grow suggests, at the very least, that audiences want
characters who they can relate too. Viewers indentify with Scream’s characters not
merely because of familiar settings, but because they too possess intertextual
(sub)cultural capital that mediate their behavior based on the media they consume.
Self-serving or not, it seems Craven is right.
Matt Hills claims that “horror’s pleasures must be assumed to be felt, materially
and affectively by audiences” (6). While in many cases this assertion is tenable, the
discursive, experiential pleasures and pedagogies of horror are independent sociological
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operators and have little need for overt reader or author cognition. A text can influence
a reader's psychological response or behavior with or without complicity, and likewise,
an author can create a text with a powerful pedagogy entirely unintentionally. In the
case of Scream, for example, the pedagogical apparatus was stalker movies in general,
not just movies by Craven; all of the stalker movies, whether they were designed as
Inoculative or not, provided inoculative material for the character without any need of
ostensible authorial intentionality. Even those characters who are not avid fans of
horror and had not previously consumed it with a realization of its inoculative potential
were still culturally aware of the general pitfalls of the genre: even someone who hates
horror as a genre is likely aware of its clichés and conventions and is still subject to a
partial inoculation.
It is also important to note that any inoculative reading of a potentially horrific
text does not come at the cost of its pleasure. I suggest that my thesis neither
challenges nor is mutually exclusive with most of the scholarship surrounding horror and
trauma studies. Neither does the fact that a novel or film can be read as inoculative
hinder or displace any of its aesthetic entertainment value. Whether or not a society is
masochistic for, in many cases, enjoying the trauma vaccination process and voluntarily
(re)submitting to it every Friday night at the movies is not the focus of the essay, but, as
Col. Dave Grossman points out in the inoculative On Killing, the fact that the same types
of wildly popular first-person shooter video games are used to train soldiers to be
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successful in combat illustrates how media inoculation can be simultaneously
aesthetically pleasurable and unintentionally informative7.
As Craven puts it, horror is a “boot camp for the psyche” in the sense that it
often presents a challenging, abrasive regimen—in its particular case, it is frequently a
course in death and violence. For Craven, this vicarious exposure to potentially
traumatic imagery facilitates the development of a greater preparedness for similar
situations the viewer may someday experience. Therefore, even a seemingly mindless
horror text can be read to function with a similar pedagogy in operation; it will, to some
varying degree, serve to inoculate its audience and mediate its future exposure to
trauma. Inoculative nonfiction, then, can be seen as a new stage in the development of
the gothic text; it draws upon familiar stylistic and narrative devices adopted by the
horror canon to tell its story and eagerly seeks comparison with gothic sensibilities. The
primary difference, its evolutionary variation, is that inoculative nonfiction privileges
exposition and analysis over the narration itself. It too offers the reader a boot camp for
the psyche, and it aims are even loftier than Craven’s. Even though reading through the
account of Kelly’s rape and attempted murder is repulsive and disturbing, “there is
something going on there that is needed”: horror develops intertextual (sub)cultural
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See Chapter 2. Grossman, an ex-Ranger, is outraged by this and rails against the video game
industry for inoculating kids the same way the military inoculates troops before combat; both groups, he
argues, are “enabled“ by media to kill. See also Grossman’s On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning
to Kill in War and Society (1997), Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill : A Call to Action Against TV, Movie and
Video Game Violence (1999), and On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War
and in Peace (2004).
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capital, forges pre-memories, generates critical distance and control, and fortifies
against breaches of incomprehensible stimuli in the psyche’s protective shield.
Finally, in addition to my previous disclaimers, I must mention the fact that any
inoculative reading of art-horror is not without some methodological problems;
specifically, not all art-horror inoculates equally well. Also, not everyone responds the
same way to a given text or emotion; what may be inoculative or merely fun to one
person may be, in fact, debilitatingly traumatic to another. However, this paradox of a
non-universal response fits neatly into the analogy of vaccination and serves to bolster
the tenability of the argument. A real vaccination can have varying degrees of success
or failure on a patient; it can even sometimes cause violent allergic reactions—some
people claim they cause autism. If the target virus of a vaccination is not properly
neutralized, the patient can inadvertently become infected during the inoculation
process. A vaccination should be administered at the proper time, and not when
someone is too sick or weak. Age is also an important factor, as some vaccines are not
suitable for the fragile immune systems of very young children. Though the specific
response is different among patients, depending on many of the dynamic factors I have
outlined, in nearly every case the patient’s body will be affected in the future by the
inoculation received. I argue that such is the case with trauma and violence in the
media. Horrific or traumatic texts have various affects on their audiences, and the
degree to which future behavior will be influenced is varied, yet certainly real. This
reading is highly productive with many texts, though certainly not all, and does not
claim to be a panacea for understanding horrific or traumatic media. As I mentioned
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earlier, though, the fact that all texts have the potential to generate vicarious trauma via
the pre-memory structure demands the need for further investigation into the precise
mechanics of how this inoculation process operates within a text and what it can enable
a reader to do.
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CHAPTER TWO: VACCINATING HUMANITY WITH HORROR AND VIOLENCE
Taking the surprise out of combat, raising the sense of confidence, and
cognitively preparing the warrior for battle is one of the primary
objectives of this book. Thus, this book can be seen as a form of stress
inoculation, and the reduction in surprise and the increase in confidence
provided within these pages will hopefully reduce the stress of combat.
(Grossman On Combat 36)
In 1997 a literary anomaly surfaced on the radar of bestseller lists across the
country. Gavin de Becker, a freelance criminologist of sorts, published The Gift of Fear
and it rapidly became an international sensation. This number one bestseller is unique
for several reasons: it is a self-help book about violence, it is quite graphic and
disturbing, and its prose can only be described as highly mediocre at best. Propelled by
a paranoid television watching public disturbed at the sudden death of Princess Diana
and by a perceived rise in “random” violent acts within the domestic sphere, de Becker
was quickly sought out for advice and sound bytes and became a popular media icon.
Gathering a farrago of endorsements from Oprah Winfrey, Marcia Clark, and Meryl
Streep, de Becker’s text is a thematic and literary conundrum: “a how-to book that
reads like a thriller” (Gift Back Cover). The Gift of Fear takes its reader step by step
through graphic accounts of rape, murder, and revenge, with each story serving to
provide insights into his major argument that claims violent behavior can be predicted,
and therefore averted or confronted. Short accounts of terror and trauma fill de
Becker’s book, which are written as “thrillers” for several ostensible reasons. First, the
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reader’s attention is inevitably seized, and on an aesthetic level, the book provides for
the same socio-cultural experience of reading or watching a horror text. Second, since
de Becker preaches that knowledge is power, by exposing his readers to what he
describes as true events (this could happen to you!), he generates a self-sustaining
market for his non-fiction, as he is the primary purveyor of this knowledge. Third, and
most importantly to de Becker, the readers, and this study, is the fact that by exposing
his reader to trauma and violence, he claims that his readers can better prepare to deal
with that same trauma in the future—if and when they are exposed to it. In short, de
Becker’s book claims to be an inoculation against future trauma.
De Becker’s three texts—The Gift of Fear: Survival Signals That Protect Us from
Violence (1997), Protecting the Gift: Keeping Children and Teenagers Safe (2000), and
Fear Less: Real Truth About Risk, Safety, and Security in a Time of Terrorism (2002)—and
Lt. Colonel Dave Grossman’s two primary texts—On Killing: The Psychological Cost of
Learning to Kill in War and Society (1997), and On Combat: The Psychology and
Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (2004)—are the pioneers of this
popular new genre. While The Gift of Fear is the most popular in its class, it is only one
of a small but rapidly growing group of books designed to train readers to deal with
trauma before it happens. The most critically lauded of these books is Grossman’s On
Killing, which was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize and claims to have invented an entire
new field of academic inquiry: “killology.” In many aspects, Grossman’s book is also
written like a thriller as he explores military history and its attendant trauma through
often extremely graphic vignettes of violence and atrocity for the purpose of both
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helping to palliate and understand the extant trauma of soldiers who have experienced
combat and to help prepare those who may experience violent trauma in the future.
These books are serving to seed a new generation of ultra-specialized texts designed to
prepare policemen, soldiers, martial artists, and housewives to deal with future trauma
through physiological, psychological, and what can best be described as literary
conditioning.
While the previous chapter introduced the genre of inoculative nonfiction and
sought to contextualize it within a framework of trauma and horror studies, in this
chapter I will more closely analyze the genre of inoculative nonfiction itself and explore
various recurring conventions, establish a common pedagogical structure, and examine
its efficacy. Inoculative nonfiction’s recent popularity among civilian and uniformed
demographics adopts a wide range of approaches and draws from a diverse canon. For
this study, I will focus my attention on three of its most commercially successful texts:
de Becker’s the Gift of Fear, Grossman’s On Killing, and On Combat. While any number
of inoculative texts might adequately serve the purposes of this analysis, these three
particular texts continue to garner the most publicity, the highest critical acclaim, and
largest audience and thus serve as premier examples of prototypes of the genre.
“A How-To Book That Reads Like a Thriller”
There are numerous types of stress inoculation employed by various professions,
explains Grossman, and all use different tools and devices to protect people against
future danger.
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Firefighters are inoculated against fire. Sailors are inoculated against
sinking ships by placing them in compartments that flood with water as
they fight to repair simulated damage. Many individuals are inoculated
against heights through rappelling and rock climbing. (On Combat 38)
Inoculative nonfiction’s first fundamental tool for inoculation is the exacerbation of
textual trauma through (hyper)dramatic narrative. Rape-survivor Kelly in The Gift of
Fear sets a dark, sensationalized tone right from page one that immediately suggests
one response from the reader—this is not your grandmother’s how-to book. Continuing
my discussion from the previous chapter, de Becker’s retelling of Kelly’s ordeal is
unlikely to win him any awards for style, but the audacity of the text is startling; since de
Becker’s vignette is concerned with what is potentially one of the most taboo and
disturbing events in Western culture—violent rape—at first glance, it seems
counterintuitive that he does not downplay the vividness of Kelly’s imminent trauma.
Instead, de Becker seeks to not only elaborate, but to amplify the trauma of the text by
providing the length in pages, details, and pathos required for his readers to almost
inevitably begin to connect and sympathize with the victim.
She closed the door behind her, pushing it until she heard it latch. She is
certain she locked it, which means he must have already been inside the
corridor. Next came the four flights of stairs, which she wanted to do in
one trip. Near the top of the third landing, one of the bags gave way,
tearing open and dispensing cans of cat food. They rolled down the stairs
almost playfully, as if trying to get away from her. [. . .] At this point, as
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she is telling me the story of the rape and the whole three-hour ordeal
she suffered, Kelly pauses to weep quietly. She knows that he killed one
of his other victims, stabbed her to death. All the while, since soon after
we sat down knee to knee in the small garden outside my office, Kelly has
been holding both my hands. She is twenty-seven years old. Before the
rape, she was a counselor for disturbed children, but she hasn’t been
back in a long while. (1, 3)
De Becker is quick to identify what behavioral warning signs Kelly ignored, what was
wrong with her response, and how one might prevent a similar event in the future; the
case study of Kelly’s attack provides context for the theoretical application of de
Becker’s inoculative strategies. The purpose of Kelly’s story within the text provides a
harrowing example of what not to do—Kelly makes several unfortunate decisions that
effectually allow the would-be killer into her apartment and the rape to occur—so that
the reader can hopefully analyze and learn from them8. However, a lack of proper
stylistic packaging would likely compromise the success of de Becker’s inoculation. The
reason The Gift of Fear seeks to exacerbate the trauma of Kelly’s attack is ostensibly for
pedagogical reasons: for the simulation to be effective, it needs to feel real and, in a
8

While pedagogically effective in many ways, this strategy can be problematic and possibly harmful:
implying to the rape victim that the attack was her fault can certainly exacerbate extant guilt and trauma.
However, de Becker does not primarily work with people to alleviate PTSD; he works with clients to
facilitate the prevention of future violence. In the case of Kelly, she wants de Becker to teach her how she
could potentially avoid this sort of incident in the future. At this point in this dialogue, Kelly is ostensibly
psychologically ready to openly discuss the event, and she is willing to analyze her actions for dangerous
behaviors. If she was not properly prepared, the results of this conversation between her and de Becker
could have been disastrous.
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hopefully controlled manner, actually traumatize the reader. De Becker could tell Kelly’s
story in a fraction of the time and without most of the extraneous details; he could
easily distill the six-page story into a short paragraph, had he wanted to. Instead, de
Becker sensationalizes the account and attempts to traumatize the reader through the
text. While Kelly is now a “veteran” of the trauma of rape herself, by vicariously
experiencing Kelly’s trauma to some degree, the text creates in its audience what
Grossman calls “‘pre-battle veterans,’ individuals with the survival skills of a veteran
warrior but without the tragic cost of real combat” (On Combat 134).
Though typically less sensationalized in its approach, Grossman’s texts function
similarly in their rhetorical operation. Traveling frequently to give lectures to military
and law enforcement agencies, Grossman retells combat stories from the people he
meets or quotes them from personal correspondence. In most cases, the narrative is in
a first person voice and seeks to create a sense of perceived realism for the reader; to
create pre-battle veterans, the text employs the gritty testimonies of “real” veterans.
Grossman’s goals of inoculation are broad, as he seeks to vicariously expose his
readership to the trauma of combat; On Combat begins by preparing the audience for
various non-lethal human physiological responses. For example, Grossman wants to
prepare his readers for “condition black,” a stage of reaction to incredible stress where
the body floods with adrenaline and normal motor control and memory rapidly declines.
Since most intellectual abilities of the brain will shut down at condition black, in order to
function appropriately under such conditions the trainee must act almost solely on
hard-wired reflexes,
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Let me tell you how powerful this autopilot business is. I came around
the corner of this guy’s van; I’m just going to tell him to move it. I didn’t
realize that he’d already killed one person. You honestly don’t know
you’re doing it. All of a sudden a gun appears in his hand. Then a hole
appears in his chest and the guy drops. My first thought was, “Whoa,
somebody shot him for me!” I actually looked over my shoulder to see
who shot this guy. Then I realized I had my gun in my hand and it was me
who had shot him. (qtd. in On Combat 74)
The first-hand account from a veteran police-officer reinforces Grossman’s
theoretical concept, and the reader may be able to vicariously share in some of the
trauma experienced by the storyteller. In other sections of the texts, the brutality and
length of the textual trauma is increased to account for the need of a “stronger”
vaccination. While teaching readers about dealing with “the full spectrum of atrocity”
on the battlefield, Grossman quotes a four-page combat nightmare from a U.N.
peacekeeping soldier deployed in the Congo in 1963. While on patrol, the teenage man
comes across “two naked black men torturing a young white woman *. . .+ assumed to
be a nun or teacher” (On Killing 217). In terrible, meticulous detail the soldier describes
the horror of the scene upon his arrival and of his discovery of the second, older nun
who lies mutilated against the wall. This particular story is probably the most gruesome
and disturbing narrative in all the canon of mainstream inoculative nonfiction. The
section is especially traumatic, as its event are so far removed from most people’s lives
that many civilians may disbelieve it—the story is too terrible, the actions are too cruel.
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And this, Grossman argues is why the reader must hear the story: “*People’s+ goodness
and decency [. . .] cause them to be so completely incapable of believing that someone
or something *. . .+ could be so evil” (212). Perhaps, he suggests, the denial of atrocity
by good, decent people is tied to our inherent resistance to killing in the first place.
Though, he continues, “We must not permit ourselves to be attracted to it. Nor can we,
in our revulsion, ignore it. Ultimately the purpose of this section, and of this study, has
been to look at the ugliest aspect of war, that we might know, name it, and confront it”
(227).
This methodology suggests, then, that the more traumatizing a text is, the more
effective it is at helping readers achieve “veteran” status. However, inoculative texts
must skirt the line between theoretical efficacy—the more traumatic the better—and
audience approachability— since most people do not want to read something that is too
disturbing or initiates too much trauma. If the text is too repellent, then people will not
read it and no inoculation can occur. Like a medical vaccine, it is the individual needs of
the patient that determine the correct dosage. This helps explains why Grossman’s
texts are considerably bloodier and more horrific in their depictions of violence than de
Becker’s, since Grossman primarily writes to military and law enforcement personnel
that are already assumed to be somewhat “hardened,” while de Becker writes typically
to civilian women and mothers. As Grossman points out, preemptive trauma mediation
is not an exact science: “Stress inoculation is not perfect, and to get a useful degree of
protection it has to be precisely applied. Last year’s flu vaccine is of limited value this
year *. . .+ and a firefighter’s inoculation against fire is of little use to him if people shoot
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at him” (On Combat 39). Since prescribing the perfect dose of psychic textual damage
for everyone in one book is impossible, it seems these authors typically strategically
choose to err on the side of too much, while trying to not lose complete palatability
from their target demographic. After all, “PTSD can be a step on the path to stress
inoculation and *. . .+ one can be stronger when they *sic+ come to the other end” (On
Combat 298). This somewhat problematizes Grossman’s earlier call for precision in the
inoculation process, but on the other hand Grossman writes primarily for soldiers and
police officers—a group he feels needs all the inoculation they can get—and is, perhaps
erroneously so, not particularly concerned about his text falling into the hands of people
it might scar beyond repair.
One way of diagramming a pedagogical context for inoculative nonfiction is to
establish a continuum of trauma training efficiency (see Table 1). At the core of each
inoculative nonfiction text is a set of theoretical principles the author wishes to teach
that will purportedly help the audience in the future, should violence arise. For example,
in The Gift of Fear de Becker wants to teach his female readers that when a male ignores
the word “No” in a potentially dangerous setting, they should consider it a serious
warning sign and prepare to take evasive or defensive action. De Becker can
communicate this through the medium of a text through various rhetorical devices. In
the first stage of the efficiency continuum is a mere theoretical description of the
principle in abstract form. More effective would be to offer the abstract principle while
providing a practical “real life” example. Inoculative nonfiction seeks to go beyond
either stage and achieve further efficiency by packaging the theoretical principle in
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(hyper)dramatic narrative. By making the example frightening, shocking, or repelling
the author can sear the abstract theory into the reader’s mind through a traumatically
unforgettable art-horror experience. Eliciting many, if not all, of the same physiological
and mental responses of natural horror, the reader is now inoculated and better
prepared to face the future.
Table 1
A Continuum of Trauma Training Efficiency
Stage

Application in The Gift of Fear

1. Abstraction

Don’t let someone ignore the word “No”

2. The Practical Example

A bland generic “textbook” example

3. Dramatic Narrative in Fiction in

Kelly’s sensationalized account of rape

Film
4. High Stress Live Drill

De Becker suggests full force martial arts
training of a rape scenario

De Becker is quick to admit that the one thing more effective than his books is
role-playing—preferably “full contact self-defense training [. . .] using padded
instructors who pose as assailants” (385). This, however, is not likely an easy product to
sell to his housewife constituency, and neither is it essential to the inoculation process.
Inoculation can successfully occur on any of the stages; the various stages appeal to
different styles of learning and need and usually work best when combined. De Becker,
for one, seems quite content walking his readers through stages one through three and
only offers a passing reference to stage four and relegates its details to his supplemental
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appendix. Grossman is more readily able to discuss and promote high stress, “live”
training to his uniformed readers in the form of paintball and other activities designed
to wrack the nerves, induce real physical pain, and create a situation nearly identical to
the potential future scenario of violence, only just barely avoiding the “tragic cost of real
combat.” Ironically, Grossman also explains that the military intentionally designs some
extreme training drills, such as Army Ranger school and Navy SEAL school, to be far
tougher and actually more traumatic than anything a typical soldier will ever likely
experience, even in wartime: he describes a soldier during the Vietnam war who, while
under heavy enemy fire, turns to his companion and says, “Well hell, at least we’re not
in Ranger school” (On Combat 132).
Outside the realm of how-to books, the memes of inoculative art as a social
experience are not without numerous counterparts in Western culture. Psychodrama,
for example, is a method that explores psychological and social problems by having
participants role-play potentially traumatic scenarios under the supervision of a
therapist. Recognizing that merely talking or reading about trauma is often not enough,
psychodrama sessions seek to “purify” the role-players through a form of the
Aristotelian notion of catharsis. The father of modern psychodrama, Jacob Moreno,
explains that Aristotle wrote that drama could purify its audience by “artistically exciting
certain emotions which act as a kind of homeopathic relief from their own selfish
passions” (209). However, Moreno explains that it is primarily the actors who receive
the benefits of a cathartic purgation. Psychodrama, then, focuses on involving its
participants as much as possible and turns spectators into actors:
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The more the spectator is able to accept the emotions, the roles and the
developments on the stage as corresponding to his own private feelings,
private roles and private developments, the more thoroughly will his
attention and his phantasy be carried away by the performance. The
paradox is, however, that he is identifying himself with something with
which he is not identical: the hero on the stage is not he, himself. The
spectator can sympathize with acts which take place on the stage just as
if they were his own acts, but they are not his; he can experience with the
actors all the pain and the torture. [. . .] The degree to which the
spectator can enter into the life upon the stage, adjusting his own feeling
to what is portrayed there, is the measure of the catharsis he is able to
obtain on this occasion. (255-6)
For Aristotle and Moreno, catharsis is not so much inoculative as it is a means to
maintain psychic “balance” and “equilibrium,” but this is largely a matter of timing. If
one consumes or engages in cathartic drama before “disequilibrium” occurs, the drama
pre-mediates the future traumatic event. Contemporary psychodrama follows a similar
pattern for training efficiency as the model I outlined earlier. Practical Approaches to
Dramatherapy (2000) contrasts the harsh approach of “flooding”—plunging a patient
“right into the middle of whatever it is that appalls and terrifies them and so learns the
hard way that they are able to survive it even at its worst”—with the much more
desirable option of psychodrama.
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The other method is much gentler and consists of introducing the person
to the loathed presence by a process of carefully graded steps, beginning
perhaps with simply talking about it, then looking at pictures, handling
something closely associated with it [. . .] until the person is used not only
to the idea but also to the actual presence of whatever it was that used
to throw them into such inner turmoil. (27)
With role-playing as a final step, the patient slowly builds up a tolerance via the
experience of catharsis, thus maximizing the efficiency of the dramatherapy. While
inoculative nonfiction does not necessarily want the reader to become “used to” trauma
and violence, it does seek to obtain the ability to maintain equilibrium under duress.
Psychodrama, like inoculative nonfiction, places great emphasis on exposition, as
Adam Blatner explains in Foundations of Psychodrama (2000): “Activating emotion
shouldn’t be the goal. *. . .+ The need for follow up is needed, though, so that
integration is ensured” (116). Here the word “integration” becomes yet another
homologue for inoculation. When Grossman shocks his readers by offering the grisly
first-hand account of the U.N. peacekeeper in Congo, he hopes the reader will be
“carried away by the performance” and “enter into” the narrative to increase the level
of catharsis; whether by vicariously experiencing (art-horror) or role-playing the events
of the drama of the text (art/natural horror), the trauma cathartically “integrates” itself
into the reader’s psyche. Grossman must also be as precise as possible with the dosage
of violence, since “Mental catharsis cannot be reproduced wholesale *. . .+ to meet all
the situations and relationships in which there may exist some cause for disequilibrium
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within a person. It has to be applied concretely and specifically” (Moreno 228). The fact
that dramatic representation in literature falls so high on the scale of trauma training
efficiency has several startling implications, the most important of which is related to
the second fundamental tool of inoculative nonfiction: by depicting violence and killing
through a textual medium, inoculative nonfiction seeks to psychologically arm its
readers and enable them to commit violence and kill.
Awakening Your Inner Sheepdog: Enabling Yourself to Kill Through Textual Conditioning
Constructing a pre-memory and establishing various counterforces for the premediation of trauma through art-horror is effective, but Grossman and de Becker realize
that the avoidance of trauma may not be enough; to avoid receiving violence, some
situations may require the ability to commit violence or even kill, and it is at this point
that the more radical nature of inoculative nonfiction comes into play. Though some
people selectively breed pit-bulls for sociopathy to ensure they can perform the
unnatural act of killing another pit-bull in a fight, breeding to overcome humanity’s
resistance to killing is not a viable option. However, Grossman argues, killing is
sometimes deemed a necessity and humans have developed technology to overcome
their limitations. “From a combat evolution perspective, the history or warfare can be
viewed as a series of successfully more effective tactical and mechanical mechanisms to
enable or force combatants to overcome their resistance to killing” (On Combat 200). If
the end goal of inoculative nonfiction is to facilitate reader survival in the event of a
dangerous or traumatic episode, and beyond that, to ensure the ability to successfully
negotiate the event with minimal subsequent psychological debilitation, with stakes this
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high it should not be surprising when de Becker and Grossman’s pedagogy advocates
readers to defend themselves by any means necessary. Once taught how to mentally
prepare for situations of trauma and violence, the second fundamental key of
inoculative nonfiction is the enabling of physical defense mechanisms, usually in the
form of aggressive violence, which the authors hope will come in part from exposure to
their (hyper)dramatic narrative. Eschewing pacifism for the capacity of self-defense, the
text seeks safety through the enabling of one’s personal potential for violence: “The
worst thing in the world is Barney Fife with a bullet in his gun: ‘Oh god! I might have to
kill him!’ The correct response is this: “I think I’m going to have to kill this guy. I knew it
might come to this someday” (On Combat 147).
While most of the conclusions and premises presented by inoculative nonfiction
are the result of inductive reasoning, the genre relies on the fact there is little debate
left as to the utility of specifically training soldiers to kill people and not just targets.
Soldiers that merely receive training on how to shoot will inevitably be very poor
soldiers. One of the most startling statistics Grossman presents is the incredibly low
historic firing rates of soldiers, as described in a study conducted by U.S. Army Brigadier
General S.L.A. Marshall. During World War II, Marshall first learned just how
unprepared their soldiers were to successfully fight and kill in battle: only 15 to 20
percent of all soldiers “would take any part with their weapons *. . .+ whether the action
was spread over a day, or two days or three” (On Killing 3). The reasons for nonfiring
are numerous, but the primary reason is that the soldiers were not mentally prepared to
be able to kill in combat. Since Marshall, other comparable studies continue to find
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similar instances of nonfiring throughout most of non-contemporary warfare. During
the American Civil War, for example, after the battle of Gettysburg, approximately 90
percent (about twenty-four thousand) of the muskets recovered from the battlefield
were found fully loaded. Twelve thousand of the muskets were double-loaded, while six
thousand had from three to ten rounds loaded in the barrel. “The obvious conclusion is
that most soldiers were not trying to kill the enemy” (22). Tactics have changed since
these conflicts: during the Korean War soldiers reached an estimated 55 percent firing
rate, and during the Vietnam War they achieved an unprecedented 90 to 95 percent
rate (181). The difference, Grossman suggests, lies not in the combat conditions or the
enemy, but almost solely in the training.
Instead of lying prone on a grassy field calmly shooting at a bull’s-eye
target, the modern soldier spends many hours standing in a foxhole, with
full combat equipment draped about his body. [. . .] At periodic intervals
one or two olive-drab, man-shaped targets at varying ranges will pop up
in front of him for brief time, and the soldier must instantly shoot at the
target(s). When he hits the target it provides immediate feedback by
instantly and very satisfyingly dropping backwards—just as a living target
would. (253)
Some sniper training courses now use balloons filled with red paint or heads of cabbage
with ketchup on top; all these changes serve to dramatically increase the chances a
soldier will successfully engage the enemy in combat with the intent to kill (244-5).
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For inoculative nonfiction to succeed in its goal to protect and prepare its
readers, it must also in some way enable them to defend themselves, should the
situation require it; the text tries to achieve this rhetorically through accustomization to
violence as a practical option and the familiarization of positively-connoted examples of
perceived justified violence. Many irresponsibly deem this tactic as “desensitization,” as
I discussed in the previous chapter, yet the complexities of training someone to commit
violence or kill through a text demands a much more complicated and nuanced
approach than any mere dulling of the senses. In fact, hypersensitivity to the sight of
blood or the concept of killing someone in general, even an attacker, is not the problem
these texts try to address; the difficulty inoculative nonfiction must overcome is the
instinctive human resistance to violence and killing in relation to proximity.
Grossman best illustrates this as he describes the intense psychological
resistance to killing nearly all people experience in close-range combat. Bomber pilots,
he argues, very rarely suffer post-traumatic stress disorder following a tour of duty, due
to the extreme range between themselves and their victims. He describes how one of
the pilots who bombed Dresden, one of most terrible scenes of destruction in the
history of modern war, wrote, “we were at 20,000 feet! *. . . + I saw no streets, no
outlines of buildings [. . .] Above the city was a misty red haze. I looked down,
fascinated but aghast, satisfied yet horrified” (On Killing 101). The bomber pilot was
virtually unscarred; for him, he was not killing people with faces and families, he was
bombing a generic cloudy landscape—the distance between the killer and the victim
absolved nearly all potential trauma. While there are certainly exceptions to this
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guideline—not all bombardiers sleep trauma-free or perform their duties all the time—
Grossman claims that this group of people is definitely part of a small minority. This
scenario is then compared to the intense resistance experienced by soldiers and civilians
attempting to kill at the hand-to-hand level. Action movies, he writes, are seldom short
on hand-to-hand combat and killing; however, very rarely do you ever see someone kill
with their bare hands. If they do, it is generally through strangulation or by the
snapping of the neck. Grossman argues that every martial artist and soldier knows that
neither of these tactics is sensible in a real combat situation—with a live target, necks
are not easy to snap and throats are not easy to choke. Instead, soldiers are often
trained to punch to the throat or, even better, to punch “a thumb through his eye and
on into the brain, subsequently stirring the intruding digit around inside the skull,
cocking it off toward the side, and forcefully pulling the eye and other matter out with
the thumb” (On Killing 131-2). This move, while one of the most technically simple
among a martial arts repertoire—almost any person of any shape or size can
successfully perform the maneuver effectively— is, however, nigh unto impossible to
bring oneself to perform, due to its extremely repellent nature. If Jackie Chan began
ripping people’s eyeballs out in his next action-comedy, his audience—though action
movie buffs—would be horrified and shocked. Yet, for matters of practical self-defense,
rigorous and systematically training can overcome this instinctive resistance. Grossman
describes how one karate instructor
trains high-level students in this killing technique by having them practice
punching their thumbs into oranges held or taped over the eye sockets of
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an opponent. [. . .] the process is made even more realistic by having the
victim scream, twitch, and jerk as the killer punches his thumb into the
orange and then rips it back out. Few individuals can walk away from
their first such rehearsal without being badly shaken and disturbed. (On
Killing 132)
One of the primary reasons de Becker and Grossman seek to traumatize readers
through graphic narration is to break through the natural resistance readers likely have
towards violence, which therefore enables them to commit violence for purposes of
self-defense. De Becker, for example, wants to train Kelly and his readers to be able to
defend themselves against future attack at any cost. Grossman wants to train his
readers to be able to kill in combat so that they are themselves not killed; in order for
either to be successful, the reader must cross certain thresholds of psychological
resistance and break various cultural taboos. Since the medium of teaching in these
texts is not a martial arts studio with the luxury of stand-in attackers, the oranges in the
eyes become graphic narrations designed to lightly singe the reader’s psyche, yet burn
just deep enough to be able to leave a lasting and empowering impression. As Wes
Craven points out earlier, horror, or in this case inoculative nonfiction, is a kind of “boot
camp for the psyche” and its aims are self-fortification and empowerment: “even if it
gives them nightmares, there’s something going on there that is needed.” A diagram of
the rhetorical strategies of inoculative nonfiction might appear according the following
simplified model:
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Table 2
A Pedagogical Model of Inoculative Nonfiction
Rhetorical Strategy

Effect on Reader

1

Dramatic narration

Seizes the reader’s attention

2

Narration contains deliberately

Heightens the reader’s faculty of

traumatizing material; the reader is

slightly scars the psyche

brought into “proximity” with
traumatizing material
3

Exposition and analysis

Explores and explains trauma to prevent
its future impact

4

The trauma vaccination conditions the

When real life trauma occurs, the

reader and preemptively mediates

conditioning mediates the experience in

future experience

some way

For de Becker, this process occurs textually as he relates stories of women who
fight back successfully against attackers with extreme violence. In one instance, he
describes an otherwise peaceful, timid housewife who hospitalizes a male attacker
twice her size with one arm while defending her small daughter at her side. As de
Becker narrates the story, he identifies specific strategies for violence and offers a clear
logic for why it works:
Holly was thinking: I don’t want to stick a key into someone’s eye. I don’t
want to hurt him that badly. On the other hand, he obviously plans to
hurt me, and I have to protect Kate [her daughter]. If I stick a key in his
eye, he’ll stop this, but I really don’t want to blind a person. Obviously
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though, I’m not going to let him hurt Kate. All this thinking was moot.
That’s because as Holly was going over her options, it turns out she
already had stuck the key into the man’s eye, and already had placed it
into the ignition. (Protecting 4-5)
De Becker praises the woman’s valor and assures the reader that this was not
only the right thing to do, but that they can and must do the same thing themselves.
This graphic account serves not only to inoculate readers to more successfully deal with
this sort of attack, should it occur to them, by eliminating at least some of the potential
surprise—the reader will hopefully be more able to anticipate a similar situation since
she has now experienced it vicariously through the text—but it also serves to validate
violence to the previously nonviolent reader. “You attack me when I’m with my little girl,
and you get the natural consequence. In fact, she thought the man got away lucky
because she could have stuck him in both eyes. That’s when she realized she had stuck
him in both eyes” (5). By providing positively-connoted examples of violence, de Becker
justifies what the reader might otherwise consider unspeakable acts of brutality and
killing; he shows his reader that it is okay to maim or kill if it is self-defense, and he
offers numerous examples as proof. In theory, this emotionally and psychologically
fortifies the reader and hopefully better enables them to survive future attack by
justifying and legitimizing the possibility of violence. If the reader chooses, de Becker
can now refer to a place where they can reinforce the lessons and “boost” the
inoculation through a live training drill—though de Becker certainly intends his text to
be sufficiently pragmatic that this is not mandatory.
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Grossman is able to provide a more sophisticated model of the process of midcrisis trauma absolution, which he calls the “diffusion of responsibility,” meaning the
removal of one’s natural resistance to killing, especially killing at close-range. The
potential killer (which here is a positively-connoted description used for the reader)
must draw upon various social and psychological constructions in order to perpetrate an
act of the violence. First, the killer can draw upon the demands of an authority figure; if
the order to kill comes from someone else and is not a decision made by the killer, the
mind can more easily justify it. In de Becker’s case, he presents himself as the authority
figure and orders his readers to attack in self-defense. The proximity of the authority
figure is important, the closer the better, and de Becker’s must overcome his lack of
geographic closeness by appealing to several other factors: respect, intensity, and
legitimacy. Though de Becker is not there with the mother ordering her to defend her
child, if he can “bond” with his readers and earn their respect in advance of the
traumatic event, his chances of “gaining compliance” to his order to kill is significantly
increased. Also, by repeating the order numerous times in an urgent fashion
throughout the text de Becker seeks to create momentum and make his order difficult
to disobey. And finally, “Leaders with legitimate, societally sanctioned *sic+ authority
have greater influence on their soldiers.” As a businessman, it is in de Becker’s best
interest on every level to establish his legitimacy; for example, celebrity and “expert”
endorsements cover his books, he mentions how he contracts for the government, and
he makes many other such appeals that seek to establish his credibility. If he can
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convince his readers that he is a legitimate authority figure, then they are much more
likely to obey his order to commit violence in self-defense (On Killing 144-45).

Fig. 1. “An Anatomy of Killing” from Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost
of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Back Bay, 1995) 142.
Second is group absolution. Grossman claims recent military research suggests
that “what motivates a soldier to do the things that no sane man wants to do in combat
(that is, combat and dying) is not the force of self-preservation but a powerful sense of
accountability to his comrades on the battlefield” (On Killing 149). In their times, the
chariot, the phalanx, the cannon, and the machine gun dominated the battlefield.
These weapons and tactics succeeded because they involved readily available support
groups that not only served to provide peer-pressure to motivate performance, but “if a
soldier feels he is letting his friends down if he doesn’t kill [. . .] then killing can be
easier” (153). For de Becker and the case of the lone mother and child, employing this
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device is easy. The support group is primarily composed of the mother’s family, and de
Becker makes it very clear that if the mother refuses to commit violence as he orders,
her group of comrades, her children and family, will pay the ultimate price.
The possible influence a group or, in de Becker’s case, a total stranger can have
on a reader may seem dubious at first, but Grossman presents compelling evidence that
supports his claim. Aside from examples such as Charles Manson and Jim Jones, who
both had a considerable amount of time to train their followers to commit violent acts,
Grossman cites the chilling “Milgram Study” conducted at Yale University in 1963.
Designed to test the level of obedience people would maintain to an authority figure,
the test was a harrowing experience for all involved. First, a stranger in a white lab coat
offers money to volunteers if they will sit in room at the controls of what they think is an
electro-shock machine; in the neighboring room is another person, an actor, who
pretends to hook himself up to the machine. The man in the white coat then asks a
series of questions to the actor, and the volunteer is ordered to administer an electric
shock for each wrong answer given. Though the shocks start small at first, the volunteer
is ordered by the man in white lab coat to increase the voltage after each question.
Soon, the actor in the other room begins to scream and beg for mercy; however, the
man in the white lab coat orders the volunteer to continue shocking him, even after the
actor ostensibly quits screaming and is dead, since silence is considered to be a wrong
answer. “How many people *. . .+ do you think were willing to shock a fellow human
being to death just because some guy in a white lab coat told them to? The shocking
answer is that 65 percent were willing. [. . .] Now if a guy with a white lab coat can make
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65 percent of all human beings kill another person [. . .] what can people with real
trappings of authority do? What can a military commander do?” (On Combat 206).
What then, one may infer, can de Becker do to the lone woman whose child is in
immediate danger after she reads all 405 pages of his book? It is important to note that
although this particular example may seem negative as used in Grossman’s text, I use it
here as a neutral example of the power of influence an authority figure can have, for
“good” or otherwise, on a human being. In short, it is a reiteration of Freud’s warning
that people should “never underestimate the need to obey” (qtd. in On Killing 142).
Third is the creation of emotional distance from killer’s victim. Most people
experience less resistance if asked to kill an animal than a human, particularly an ugly
animal or one that is considered a pest—for example, you can readily buy bug-killing
products at the grocery store, but not people-killing products. Thus, dehumanizing an
enemy may avert much of the natural resistance most people feel about killing humans
and enable violence against them; this is why soldiers often do not speak of fighting
“people” in combat scenarios and instead frequently use disparaging epithets.
Emotionally, it is one thing to kill a group of humans, and another completely to fry a
bunch of gooks; the enemy is culturally presented as “inferior” and “less than human:
the stupidity of local customs is ridiculed, local personalities are presented as evil
demigods” (161). If properly trained through the text, de Becker’s lone mother can
instantly activate this mechanism in a time need. The thing attacking her and her child
is no man with a wife and kids of his own; it is a filthy monster, a murderer, white trash,
and a scum bag. Whether or not these descriptions are even remotely accurate is
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entirely irrelevant, as they serve to enable her to commit violence that she would not
otherwise ever commit. She does not fight or kill a person; she defends herself from a
dangerous sub-human beast.
Grossman is able to attain much greater detail in his rhetorical approach than de
Becker in enabling his readers to kill, and he describes at length how to best train
soldiers and police officers to effectively kill in combat situations throughout both texts.
Using the term “warrior” frequently, Grossman is particularly interested in inoculating
his audience against hesitancy when killing. From a retired Colonel of the Vietnam War,
Grossman offers this metaphor.
Most of the people in our society are sheep. They are kind, gentle,
productive creatures who only hurt each other by accident. [. . .] Then
there are the wolves, and the wolves feed on the sheep without mercy.
Do you believe that there are wolves out there who will feed on the flock
without mercy? You better believe it. There are evil men in this world
and they are capable of evil deeds. The moment you forget that or
pretend it not so, you become a sheep. There is no safety in denial. Then
there are the sheepdogs. [They] live to protect the flock and confront the
wolf. [. . .] The sheep generally do not like the sheepdog. He looks a lot
like the wolf. He has fangs and the capacity for violence. [. . .] Still, the
sheepdog disturbs the sheep. He is a constant reminder that there are
wolves in the land. (qtd. in On Combat 181-182)
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Inoculative nonfiction is in the business of perpetuating the “sheepdog” caste, and it
employs all of its rhetorical strategies as means to this end. Police officers, for example,
ostensible sheepdogs by profession, inoculate themselves through the text against
indecision in combat situations by a similar means as de Becker’s lone mother.
Grossman, the established expert and authority on violence and killing, orders the police
officer not to hesitate when killing. The text presents positively-connoted examples of
police officers who did not hesitate and offers praise for their decisions; alternately, the
text analyzes negative examples of various failures and then invites the reader to learn
from them. The text derides enemies as a criminal scum bags, and tells the officer he
must never let his fellow officers down. This process seeks to enable the reader to more
effectively commit violence and reduces the natural hesitancy towards killing, should
the course of events require it. The dramatic retelling of sensationalized events serves
as a heuristic that is hopefully more memorable, and thus more effective, than a mere
textbook or lecture containing similar material. As proof this works, Grossman again
points to the historic levels of nonfiring rates, which plummeted dramatically once the
military began appealing to all four levels of trauma training continuum I have outlined
and implementing tactics for the group absolution of trauma directly into basic training.
If depictions of positively-connoted violence in a text can enable it audience to
succeed in a combat situation and commit violence or kill, then it seems the opposite
can also be true: “giving warriors the experience of losing in a simulation actually begins
to condition a risk aversion pathway in the brain to which they may turn during similar
experiences in the future—they may actually stop fighting and give up as they were
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programmed to do in training” (On Combat 134). The antithesis of inoculative
nonfiction, then, is a text, film, or heuristic in which the protagonist cannot survive the
traumatic event and the narrative attempts to deny the audience a chance learn from
the experience. Such depressing nihilistic endings, such as that in George A. Romero’s
Night of the Living Dead (1968), or the more recent film by Frank Darabont, The Mist
(2007), may reinforce the possibility of future trauma and in fact create “pre-battle”
casualties. Bleak or not, the fact that this structure is aesthetically appealing to many
fans of horror is undeniable—as I will demonstrate at length in the following chapter
with the case of H.P. Lovecraft.
What may prove fruitful, though, as an explanation for those texts that seem to
break this pedagogical model is a brief comparison to the manifesto of The Theatre of
Cruelty by the French dramatist Antonin Artaud. Appalled by the mundane aspects of
civilized life and what he felt was its accompanying false reality, Artaud envisioned a
creed of The Theatre of Cruelty, a spiritual and emotional project designed to “choose
themes and subjects corresponding to the agitation and unrest of our times” (80). For
Artaud, cruelty was not necessarily evil, or even something one should avoid; rather, it
was a “very lucid, a kind of strict control and submission to necessity.” He claimed that
“There is no cruelty without consciousness, without the application of consciousness,
for the latter gives practising any act in life a blood red tinge, its cruel overtones, since it
is understood that being alive means the death of someone else” (80). Adopting a
similar methodology to contemporary psychodramatists, Artaud tried to remove the
aesthetic distance of the stage by exposing the spectator to the turbulent emotions of
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life through art that was shocking and disturbing by design. As Lee Jamieson explains,
“By turning theatre into a place where the spectator is exposed rather than protected,
Artaud was committing an act of cruelty upon them” (23). But Artaud’s cruelty was
neither self-indulgent nor malicious; it was designed as a vehicle for cathartic
experience. He writes, “This cruelty will be bloody if need be, but not systematically so,
and will therefore merge with the idea of a kind of severe mental purity, not afraid to
pay the cost one must pay in life” (81). If Artaud is right, then perhaps this notion of
cruelty provides another lens to view the phenomenon of textual or artistic inoculation;
beyond pragmatics, it is a phenomenological mechanism of humanistic discovery and a
somewhat dark celebration of our lives, as observed most commonly through our own
suffering and the horrors of other people’s lives. Inoculation, by virtue of its proclivities
as a purveyor of discomfort, at the very least momentarily jostles its readers out of their
“intellectual stupor.” Maybe inoculation provides more than just survival strategies, but
presents some insight into life itself.
In the anguished, catastrophic times we live in, we feel an urgent need
for theatre that is not overshadowed by events, but arouses deep echoes
within us and predominates over our unsettled period. Our longstanding
habit of seeking diversions has made us forget the slightest idea of
serious theatre which upsets all our preconceptions, inspiring us with
fiery, magnetic imagery and finally reacting on us after the manner of
unforgettable soul therapy. (Artaud 64-5)
The Inoculative Age
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While the precise efficacy of inoculative nonfiction is impossible to measure, the
fact that mediation occurs, in some fashion, seems incontrovertible for several reasons.
First, the very existence of inoculative nonfiction as a discrete and highly successful
genre, at least in terms of popular opinion, demands that scholars acknowledge the fact
that a very large body of Americans believe they can avoid trauma through textual
preparation. While perceptions of trauma inoculation’s effectiveness are not proof
mediation occurs, the degree to which the methodology of vaccination is instilled into
American culture demands theorists address it critically. Beyond nonfiction “how-to”
books, many aspects of society embrace inoculation theory. For example, the popular
television show World’s Scariest Police Videos begins with the ominous promise, “Real
cops, real crooks, real cases! What you see may shock you, but we bring it to you for
one reason: because knowledge is power.” Likewise, the show Man vs. Wild lets
viewers watch a slightly crazed survival expert eat raw meat, drink his own urine, and
barely survive hypothermia; the announcer begins each episode asking, “Does Bear
Grylls really need to do these things? Probably not. But you might!” Also, paired with its
sister text, World War Z: An Oral History of the Zombie War, The Zombie Survival Guide
by Max Brooks is a dead-pan serious study in inoculative speculative fiction, which
promotes itself in almost the exact same manner as de Becker and Grossman:
The Zombie Survival Guide is your complete resource for surviving an
encounter with the undead. You’ll learn how to recognize your enemy
and choose the right weapons to defend yourself. You’ll get information
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on the latest in killing techniques, along with tips on what to do when on
the defense, on the run, or on the attack. (Brooks, par. 2)
Ironically, many authors of the necessarily sensationalized genre of inoculative
nonfiction consistently deplore what they see as gratuitous violence in film, electronic
games, and television; in fact, Grossman goes so far as to devote the final five chapters
of his book On Killing to the perceived dangers of violent film and video games, and then
later wrote an entire book on the topic, entitled Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill: A Call to
Action Against TV, Movie and Video Game Violence (1999). While singing the praises of
Super Mario Brothers for its ability to help “develop trial-and-error and systematic
problem-solving skills” (On Combat 314), Grossman agonizes over the more realistic
shooter games, which he claims are far too similar to training tactics used my military
and law enforcement personal; violence in the media enables kids to commit violence
and kill through repetitive conditioning in the same way as soldiers police officers.
While a soldier arguably want to receive violence inoculation during their training, the
chances of a young child successfully internalizing and coping with vicarious trauma in
the media is much less likely: “*The kids+ ‘drop out’ out of this ‘boot camp’ violentization
process, but they are forever scarred by their experience” (On Combat 236).
True or not, Grossman is highly reactionary in his response to perceived violence
in the media, yet the crux of this paradox lies in the fact that he, de Becker, and others
are not only large scale producers of violent media themselves—in the form of always
bloody inoculative nonfiction—but that they single-handedly launched a campaign that
purveys enabling, graphic violence to entirely new audiences that are otherwise not
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likely to play violent video games or consume violent media. In de Becker’s case, this
new audience seems to consist of predominantly middle and upper-class women.
Though de Becker might argue that these women need enabling in order to survive in a
violent society and are statistically unlikely to perpetrate wanton violence on others,
one might also argue that today’s children have an even greater need for survival
strategies than do middle or upper-class women; it is the same dilemma summarized by
the flippant bumper sticker, “Guns don’t kill people, I kill people!” that inoculative
nonfiction has yet to successfully navigate its way beyond.9
De Becker himself advocates “sheepdog” training for kids in the form of selfdefense and kidnap prevention courses, but then does not seem to think training a child
to gouge a kidnapper’s eyes will increase the child’s propensity for reckless violence.
The difference, claims Grossman, is that the exposure kids receive from the media to
violence and trauma is “without the safeguard of discipline” (On Combat 235). This
seems reasonable, but Grossman cannot help but establish a direct correlation, which is
suspicious at best and at its worst is utterly fallacious: “Most kids inflicted with media
violence do not become killers, they just become depressed and fearful” (On Combat
238). Perhaps for the sheep caste this holds true, but it not typically sheep that the
aesthetics of horror and violent media typically appeal to; kids that do not enjoy the
experience of watching a horror movie or playing a violent video game are less likely to
voluntarily consume it. Unfortunately for his case, the parental warnings Grossman

9

An example of this problematic discourse is found in an interview of de Becker by Christopher
Springmann in the July 2000 issue of GUNS Magazine.
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readily endorses for video games are notably lacking on the cover of any of his texts;
and without age restrictions, his books are considerably easier for a child to acquire
than any current R- or X-rated film.
Grossman concludes his argument: “We are reaching that stage of
desensitization at which the inflicting of pain and suffering has become a source of
entertainment: vicarious pleasure rather than revulsion. We are learning to kill, and we
are learning to like it” (On Killing 311). However, this statement loses much, if not all, of
its impact and meaning when contextualized within a broader history of violence and
culture; that fact that the wolf and sheepdog castes often enjoy their training and roles
as purveyors of violence is certainly not a recent cultural development. The long
tradition of both spectatorship and participation in such violent pastimes as sporthunting, animal fighting, and gladiatorial-style combat by all societies and nations
extends back millennia in some form or another. Indeed, the only trend that could
possibly be new in terms of violence-related hobbies would be their absence from
society. Though de Becker and Grossman are correct when they identify the modern
era as one where technology facilities the possibility for the rapid production and
distribution of violent media to a greater degree than previous ages anticipated, the
conclusions they reach and consequences they suggest as a result of this are highly
problematic when viewed from a larger historical context
My purpose here is to highlight and outline the phenomenon of trauma
inoculation, and since this study is analytical in nature and not a tract promoting
inoculative nonfiction as social program, I will neither defend nor condemn its practical
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implementation here. The paradox I just outlined is one that Americans will not soon
resolve, and public perceptions of the ethics of trauma inoculation will thus remain
highly controversial. When, how, and if people—and civilians and children, in
particular—should receive inoculation lies within the realm of Isaiah Berlin’s notion of
positive liberty and will be left to the partisans and pundits. What is of great interest to
this study, though, is how the discursive process of inoculation plays out textually
between author, reader, and text. Now that this chapter has explored the basic
mechanics of how inoculative nonfiction works to generate pre-memories for readers
and enables them to better deal with trauma, the follow chapter will investigate similar
operations of the category of pre-memory through the lens of horror fiction; in
particular, I will seek to uncover how one horror author used his own texts to inoculate
himself.
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CHAPTER THREE: “ALL THE COSMOS IS A JEST”: PREEMPTIVE TRAUMA MEDIATION IN
THE FICTION OF H.P. LOVECRAFT
The oldest and strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and
strongest kind of fear is fear of the unknown. (Lovecraft Supernatural
Horror 1)
Susannah Radstone writes that “well before the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, it was already commonplace to suggest that the twentieth
century would be ‘remembered as the century of historical trauma’” (457). Today,
many scholars study the implications surrounding the political power and socio-cultural
impact of perceived suffering through postcolonial theory, gender, race, holocaust, and
other cultural studies—to name a few. Technology’s newfound ability to convey images,
events, and experiences nearly instantly—or at least to transmit compelling simulacra of
such—provides unparalleled possibilities for spectatorship between competing accounts
of trauma and violence around the world: these visual and aural media are conveniently
packaged for personal consumption and piped directly into our homes. Though
Slovenian cultural critic Slavoj Žižek notes the relative absurdity for one nation or society
to privilege one set of traumatic events over another “which do not have the luck to be
elevated by the media into the sublime victim of Absolute Evil,” the ubiquity of
traumatic representation in modern society is undeniable (137). In Trauma Culture: The
Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature (2005), E. Ann Kaplan claims,
scholars have rarely addressed the issue of vicarious trauma in people’s
response to popular media. Studying vicarious trauma is especially
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important in an era when global media project images of catastrophes all
over the world as they are happening. Most of us generally encounter
trauma vicariously through the media rather than directly. Since such
exposure may result in symptoms of secondary trauma, we need to know
as much as possible about the process. (87)
The highly interdisciplinary field of inoculative nonfiction provides an especially useful
background to successfully enter into the discussion Kaplan suggests is still wanting by
combining relevant research from the fields of military science, psychology, trauma
studies, and other related areas.
In the first chapter I made the case that both horror and inoculative nonfiction
share many of the same rhetorical strategies and effects, and in the second chapter I
explored inoculative nonfiction at length and outlined two of its general practices on its
own terms. Drawing from the frameworks I have previously discussed, this chapter will
attempt to more closely examine the utility and various challenges of reading horror as
inoculative. By doing so I hope to provide new insight into both genres and further
corroborate my initial claim that the two are indeed highly similar. As a specific point of
contact, this study will reread H.P. Lovecraft’s notion of “cosmic horror” as an example
of the inoculative potentiality of textual horror. Though any number of horror texts or
authors or might adequately function as examples for this section, Lovecraft is an ideal
candidate for several reasons. First, while I contend that nearly all horror can be read as
inoculative to some degree, most authors do not intend it outright, and I have already
demonstrated how a text that is aware of it inoculative potentiality functions in the case
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of Scream. Second, a reading of Lovecraft’s work as inoculative ostensibly presents a
much more challenging task than Scream, as Lovecraft was explicitly and adamantly
anti-didactic; in fact, few authors would bristle more than Lovecraft at the thought of
having their fiction read as pragmatic and potentially beneficial to society. Third,
Lovecraft wrote extensively about his ideolog(ies) and methodolog(ies) for “weird”
fiction, and thus presents an tremendous depth of critical conversation to address and
explore. Fourth and finally, a seemingly counterintuitive rereading of Lovecraft’s work
as inoculative is a substantial departure from previous scholarship surrounding him and
will hopefully generate new insight into his fiction. This chapter will serve to further
establish my initial claim that writers of horror fiction draw implicitly upon the logic of
trauma theory in claiming that such literature has the power to inoculate, and in doing
so prompts us to recognize the emergence of the new category of pre-memory.
The Cosmic Horror of H.P. Lovecraft
Horror literature and film frequently operate in a similar manner to that of
inoculative nonfiction, though with one major difference. Many early gothicists, such as
Walpole, Radcliffe, Lewis, and others, were culturally obligated to provide a tidy moral
for their stories and engage in overt didacticism—thus ostensibly justifying their
expeditions into the realm of the macabre and appeasing at least some of the genre’s
critics—and therefore conform to this model with relative ease. However, with the
advent of modern and postmodern aesthetics, the nihilistic ideologies of much of
(post)modern horror fiction and film seemingly troubles the inoculative nonfiction
pattern in the sense that for most horror fans and critics overt didacticism has not only
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lost its popularity, but is, in many cases, its own stringent taboo10. For example, though
Wes Craven may claim to write his films as “boot camps,” it would be completely
untenable to argue that all horror has a similar premeditated agenda. The weird fiction
writers of the Modern Era—Arthur Machen, M.R. James, H.P. Lovecraft, Ambrose Bierce,
and Lord Dunsany, to name a few—deliberately eschewed the morality of the high
gothic romances. None were more outspoken about this than Lovecraft, whose well
documented ideology of mechanistic materialism railed against even the suggestion of a
moral in fiction. For Lovecraft, teaching, conditioning, or inoculation of any kind would
never have been consideration.
Howard Phillips Lovecraft (1890-1937) was an American author of gothic fiction
who primary wrote short stories for pulp magazines such as Weird Tales. Possessing
near superhuman prolificacy, Lovecraft was “undoubtedly the most phenomenal letterwriter in history” (Gullette 2). Writing an estimated 100,000 letters in his lifetime
comprising several million words, “his output, by one comparison, “exceeded that of
other noted epistolarians Voltaire, Horace Walpole, and Samuel Johnson combined” (1).
Lovecraft’s gothic fiction frequently operates within the framework of a loosely
organized pantheon of mysterious entities many now refer to as the “Cthulhu Mythos.”
Protagonists in a Lovecraft tale seldom fare well and rarely escape death or madness at
the hands of a cruel or utterly indifferent universe that they can never fully understand.
Stories in the Cthulhu Mythos frequently explore occultism, malevolent cosmic entities,
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and violent psychological breaches in perceptions of space and time; always central to
Lovecraft’s fiction are persistent themes of pessimism and a cynical rejection of
humanocentric ideals. Though he received little recognition in his lifetime, within the
last forty years or so scholarship surrounding him has flourished and elevated him to a
status where many now compare him in significance to Poe, and some popular critics
even go as far as to claim him as the “undisputed greatest practitioner of the classic
horror tale” (King Cover).
Like many gothic authors, Lovecraft typically wrote about things that frightened
him, and what scared Lovecraft was the fear of the dark sublime. As Bradley Will writes,
“Lovecraft scares his readers not with the unknown but with the unknowable. His
stories force us to look at and wonder about the outside, but more importantly, he
demands that we recognize our own limitations and our relatively insignificant place in
the cosmos” (Will 13). As a staunch and open atheist in a time of radical scientific
discovery, failures of empirical reasoning created a vehicle for uninhibited soul-shaking
terror. Fueled by world events and the various discoveries of his day, Lovecraft saw
terror in the insignificance of the human race and found the staggering implications of
modern physics and astronomy particularly unsettling, which he felt left little room for
the fragile egos of mankind or any place for a benevolent god.
I have no opinions—I believe in nothing [. . .] My cynicism and skepticism
are increasing, and from an entirely new cause—the Einstein Theory [. . .]
All is chance, accident and ephemeral illusion. [. . .] There are no values in
all infinity—the least idea that there are, is the supreme mockery of all.
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All the cosmos is a jest, and one thing is as true as another. I believe
everything and nothing—for all is chaos, always has been, and always will
be. (Selected Letters I 231)
Where a scientist might revel in the various unknown mysteries of the universe,
Lovecraft’s fictive encounters present the cosmos as dolefully unknowable and terrifying
to his characters. The monsters and extradimensional beings in his fiction are not
necessarily terrifying because of any corporeal menace, but because his characters
cannot reduce or understand them through conventional means, signaling what
Lovecraft sees as a gross lack in human knowledge and awareness. In his essay
Supernatural Horror in Literature, Lovecraft defines the basic textual mechanics of
cosmic horror:
A certain atmosphere of breathless and unexplainable dread of outer,
unknown forces must be present; and there must be a hint, expressed
with a seriousness and portentousness becoming its subject, of that most
terrible conception of the human brain—a malign and particular
suspension or defeat of those fixed laws of Nature which are our only
safeguard against the assaults of chaos and the daemons of unplumbed
space. (3)
For the purposes of this study, cosmic horror has two primary meanings: it is first
a type of phobia potentially experienced by his audience, but it also indicates the name
and categorization of Lovecraft’s literary genre. Shattering the perceived “fixed laws of
Nature” in front of the bewildered eyes of a Lovecraftian protagonist is essentially a
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linguistic move and illustrates what Will calls in “H.P. Lovecraft and the Semiotic
Kantian Sublime” a “semiotic crisis” (5). Denying his characters an adequate system of
signification suggests something “so far beyond the edges of our language, so far
removed from our frame of reference, that it defeats the system. [. . .] Its only
designation can be its lack of designation. It is, if you will, a blank spot. This ‘blank
spot’—a signified with no signifier or a signifier with no signified—is a failure of the
system of language” (6). Lovecraft uses the motif of the blanks spot to some extent in
all of his fiction, and it occurs in many forms.
Lovecraft’s most famous story, “The Call of Cthulhu,” also builds upon the
concept of cosmic horror as spawned from a series of semiotic crises. The story reveals
the deplorable plight of several men who become involved in a hunt across the globe for
clues to a titanic underwater beast named Cthulhu that is waiting for the stars to
properly align so it can rise up and wreak havoc among humanity. One of the clues
comes in the form of a demonic cult chanting in a remote swamp village. The narrator is
baffled not just by the cultists’ presence, but by the inexplicable nature of their chants,
which are not based on any earthly linguistic system:
The cultists' incantation, “Ph'nglui mglw'nafh Cthulhu R'Iyeh wgah'nagl
fhtagn,” is itself an element of the Kantian sublime. *. . .+ Lovecraft makes
a point of showing that these names are not derived from a mundane
linguistic system [. . .] Lovecraft presents a sensation which is not sound
but is analogous to sound. He presents a language which, likewise, is a
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language only by analogy. They are [. . .] part of the depiction of the
sublime. They are themselves indeterminate signifiers. (Will 12)
The cosmic terror climaxes at the end of the story as a Norwegian ship arrives at the
mysterious island that has risen from the bottom of the sea. As the sailors explore the
island’s bizarre “non-Euclidean” architecture, they inadvertently release Cthulhu, who
crawls out of a cave and begins an terrible rampage: “The Thing cannot be described—
there is no language for such abysms of shrieking and immemorial lunacy, such eldritch
contradictions of all matter, force, and cosmic order” (21). The conclusion of the story
reveals that the members of the ship’s crew that are not killed go insane due to their
encounter with Cthulhu—not because of a fear of death, but as a response to the shock
of Cthulhu as a manifestation of the unrepresentable and as a gruesome failure of their
preconceptions about the universe. This linguistic assault on the minds of his characters
and the readers corresponds with Lovecraft’s staunch mechanistic materialism that
afforded him little personal comfort or hope:
Now, all my tales are based on the fundamental premise that common
human laws and interest and emotions have no validity or significance in
the vast cosmos at large. To me there is nothing but puerility in a tale in
which the human form—and the local human passions and conditions
and standards—are depicted as notice to other worlds or other universes.
To achieve the essence of real externality, whether of time or space or
dimension, one must forget that such things as organic life, good and evil,
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love and hate, and all such local attributes of negligible and temporary
race called mankind have existence at all. (Selected Letters II 150)
To label Lovecraft as merely an atheist or materialist is, perhaps, to do his rather
complicated ideology a great deal of injustice. Cosmic horror, which Lovecraft uses
synonymously with “real externality” in the previous passage, was not just a knee-jerk
reaction or angry criticism of the idealistic humanists but was a textual vehicle searching
for truth, beauty, and meaning in a cold and unfeeling universe. Though certainly
cynical, cosmic horror is potentially empowering as it presents a chance to free oneself
from what Lovecraft called the “galling limitations” of natural laws, “which forever
imprison and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius
of our sight and analysis” (Misc. Writings 113). As a vehicle, cosmic horror also provides
the necessary connection to inoculative nonfiction though the process of textual
“exorcism.”
Textual Exorcism
Many, if not most, contemporary horror authors and directors seemingly adopt
some form of a cosmic horror aesthetic—at least in the sense that textual moralism
remains largely out of style. While exceptions exist, usually in form of karmic tales of
revenge, this does not preclude attempts at reading horror as unintentionally
inoculative. While I concede it is highly unlikely that even the openly didactic texts of
Walpole, Radcliffe, Lewis, and other early horror authors had the methodology of
inoculative fiction in mind, the logic of trauma inoculation suggests that, intentional or
not, all horror texts serve to preemptively mediate future trauma for their readers in a
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similar fashion to that of inoculative nonfiction. Just as de Becker can tell a story of a
graphic rape and scar his readers to modify future behavior, so does anyone who reads
a gothic text or watches a horror film scar themselves in a nearly identical fashion. Even
without deliberate analysis and exposition, exposure to simulated trauma in text can
mediate future experience; or, as Caruth explains, it “may result in symptoms of
secondary trauma.”
Though, as previously discussed, vicariously experienced trauma can be harmful
or palliative, many scholars believe that the creation and consumption of horror media
is potentially therapeutic. In his survey of twentieth-century horror film Tony
Magistrale writes, “at its best horror *. . .+ is perhaps most like a visit to a trusted
psychoanalyst: we reveal something of what is troubling us, and in return we get the
opportunity to explore its meaning to our lives—and maybe, if we are lucky, to leave
less anxious than when we arrived” (18). This concept becomes clearer by returning
momentarily to the mind of Lovecraft. Though vehemently anti-didactic in principle,
Robert Bloch theorizes that, in fact, Lovecraft may have explicitly sought to cope with
the trauma of his life through the writing of cosmic horror:
Consider the phenomenon of exorcism, this time from the view-point of
the artist rather than the audience. Most writers who chose to work
within the horror genre do so to exorcise their own fears by exposing and
expressing them to an audience. [. . .] Drawing upon a common heritage
of myth, legend, and fairy tales, they employ a technique of conveying
their visions in terms of convincing reality. [. . .] Lovecraft intended to
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present an explanation of why horror fiction appealed to certain types of
readers. And in so doing he unconsciously revealed his own reasons for
writing—as attempts to come to grips with a lifelong fear of the unknown.
(xxiv-xxvi)
Bloch’s thought directly corresponds with Magistrale’s notion that horror seeks to ease
anxiety and better prepare the reader—or in this case, the author—for future trauma;
for Lovecraft, this process is somewhat covert. Coming to grips with a past fear is not
the same as preparing for future anxiety, but once again, this is largely a matter of
timing. Just as a psychodramatist can prepare for a future traumatic event through roleplaying and developing a pre-memory, the logic of trauma inoculation suggests that a
writer may pre-exorcise personal demons before they can take up residence in one’s
soul. The fallacy of too easily determining authorial intention aside, there is no shortage
of scholarship suggesting that Lovecraft wrote to ameliorate his own trauma; the best of
which I will outline now outline.
One does not have to delve very far into Lovecraft’s biography to find repeated
instances of fear, loneliness, isolation, and longing for connection. (Surely a look into
most people’s biographies would reveal much of the same.) Lovecraft’s seemingly
favorite motif, the monster, would thus be, according to Bloch, the literary incarnation
of Lovecraft’s own fear and anxieties. Whereas in “reality” the problems of life—like
Lovecraft’s feelings of isolation, racism, atheism, marital anxiety, and so on—are
problems that are difficult to describe, defeat, or even acknowledge, through his fiction
he could create monsters that served as tangible outlets for non-corporeal problems.
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This sounds suspiciously like repression, which, in this case, is half correct. Fueled by
Lovecraft’s “industrial-strength eugenics” (Jones 129)—which, to be fair, extend well
beyond mere xenophobia to a general sense of misanthropy—his supposed asexuality,
and an active disdain for religion, a conventional Freudian reading would suggest that
Lovecraft’s work is little more than yet another example of the standard “return of the
repressed” motif. Advocated by Robin Wood, the structure of the return of the
repressed, or the return to repression, claims that “horror genre is the struggle for
recognition of all that our civilizations represses or oppresses, its re-emergence
dramatized [. . .] as an object of horror [. . .] and the happy ending (when it exists)
typically signifying the restoration of repression” (qtd. in Hill 49).
In one sense, this succinctly explains the existence of inoculative nonfiction as a
genre. Violence, like sexuality, is actively repressed by most modern cultures. Though
the slaughtering of animals for food used to be an integral part of most people’s lives,
now, with omnipresent supermarkets and pre-packaging, most Americans can go their
entire lives eating all the meat they want without ever having to see a drop of animals’
blood. This once common ritual of violence is now a spectacle reduced to underground
video “nasties,” such as in the case of Shockumentary.com, which currently purveys the
slaughter of animals under the heading of “the most kick ass rotten videos ever made
[. . .] These are unmistakably underground videos [that have] long been a staple of frat
houses and cult hazing ceremonies and is required viewing for any serious fan or
collector.” Grossman points out that he is, for all his years in the military, a “virgin” of
killing himself; thus we may surmise that his texts are themselves a type of self-
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inoculation against his own repression—he wants to explore that which is culturally
forbidden to him. He claims, “To neglect *violence+ is to indulge it. This is, therefore, a
study of aggression, a study of violence, and a study of killing” (On Killing xxix). For
Grossman and de Becker, the “happy ending” Woods refers to in the return of the
repressed motif is the social justification and liberation inoculative nonfiction provides
for committing violence. Inoculative nonfiction liberates its readers by enabling them to
confront and perpetrate violence, though simultaneously commanding them to use
their power with the strictest discipline—repressing them all over again. Thus the
sheepdog caste can continue living in relative peace among the sheep with the hope
that it can deactivate its own repression on command and bare its teeth at will.
Woods’ reading, and any reading of Lovecraft’s fiction as merely an exercise in
confronting repression, though, fails to take into account the fact that as a phobic
pressure point Lovecraft’s cosmic horror was not a repressive cultural trend he wanted
to confront, defeat, and rebury. For Lovecraft, though certainly repulsive and terrifying,
cosmic horror is more akin to a Pandora’s Box that one must open and learn to deal with
in perpetuity. Whether or not Cthulhu is in the shape of “a terrifying vagina” (Jones
129-30) and is a reflection of Lovecraft’s own sexual insecurities is but a footnote to the
looming shadow of ever-present cynicism. Thus, I would argue, that the various
secondary motifs in Lovecraft’s fiction—xenophobia, misogyny, and so forth—are likely
the capricious irruptions of Lovecraft’s personal repression, but that they are somewhat
arbitrary and completely subservient to the persistent ideology of mechanistic
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materialism. What makes a Lovecraftian monster unique and different from a “return
of the repressed”-style slasher villain is the pessimism of cosmic horror.
For Lovecraft, there is no salvation for humanity, no hope of the triumph of
science, and it is only a matter of time before we are all extinct and forgotten. The fact
that Lovecraft typically frames his stories using the archetypal structure of a failed hero
quest for truth can, by extension, be read to suggest that the result of Lovecraft’s own
personal quest for truth and meaning led him to just that—disappointment and
“monsters.” In his essay “The Outsider,” Dirk Mosig points out that Lovecraft’s cynical
view of the world extended itself to believe that most people are unhappy and that this
life of constant suffering is generally not favorable to death. Seriously considering
suicide at one point, he finally decided against it on the grounds that the aesthetic
pleasure he found in the study of “eighteenth-century art slightly tipped the scales in
favor of life. He considered the quest for truth, for new knowledge, the sole possible
justification for the existence of the human species, and his eternal question was ‘what
is reality?’” (35).
This quest for “reality” took many forms. It is well documented that many of
Lovecraft’s stories correspond directly to current events and anxieties of his day.
Lovecraft, like Poe, was fascinated by catastrophes and scientific discoveries, both of
which served to reinforce his materialistic outlook on life. For example, Lovecraft wrote
both “At the Mountains of Madness” and “The Whisperer in Darkness,” at or around the
time C.W. Tombaugh discovered Pluto in 1930; reports of oceanic earthquakes
immediately preceded both “Dagon” and “The Call of Cthulhu”; and “The Horror at Red
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Hook” followed Lovecraft’s much detested stay in a “degenerate” Brooklyn suburb
(Lieber 6). It should then come as no surprise to those who are familiar with Lovecraft’s
ideology that the version of reality his protagonists find on their “quests” correspond
directly to the “god(s)” Lovecraft found in his own search for truth and meaning: the
gods of cynical materialism. Fritz Lieber explores this concept in his essay “A Literary
Copernicus” as he describes Lovecraft’s chief “god” throughout the Cthulhu Mythos,
Azathoth, who is the
supreme deity, occupying the top-most throne in the Cthulhu hierarchy.
There is never any question of his being merely an alien entity from some
distant planet or dimension. *. . .+ He is unquestionably “god,” and also
the greatest god. Yet when we ask what sort of god, we discover that he
is the blind, idiot god *. . .+ “the mindless daemon-sultan” *. . .+ “the
monstrous nuclear chaos.” Such a pantheon and such a chief deity can
symbolize only one thing: the purposeless, mindless, yet all-powerful
universe of materialistic belief. (9)
It is, Lieber continues, this association of fiction and creator that shows how
Lovecraftian protagonists are “drawn to the unknown as much as they dread it.
Quaking at the horrors that may lurk there, yet they cannot resist the urge to peer
beyond the rim of space” (10).
Lovecraft frequently depicts his characters’ journey to confront the unknown in
terms of a figurative descent through invented mythology, which is usually facilitated by
a literal descent into a basement, dungeon, or deep into the abyss of space. Maurice
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Lévy argues that this descent into myth has a “therapeutic significance” for Lovecraft
(111).
These images [of descent] hold a signification. The endless steps, the
inclined planes, the spirals that bore into space lead no doubt to the
elements of a setting, as but as surely perhaps to the obscurest region of
abysmal life. The vertical axis that they define forms an inner place, a
space inside which the author, more than his characters, explores his
dreams with muffled and agonized steps. Are the monsters that
populate his oeuvre perhaps those he discovers, or imagines, he
discovers, in the very depths of himself? We think of the slabs, the heavy
rocks that the actors of certain dramas cautiously place over the orifices
of the lower world: a wise measure taken by those who know to maintain
their demons in a thankful lethargy. . . . [sic] But it is a tenacious evil,
inscribed in the obscurest folds of the past, and it laughs at such
obstacles, breaks all the barriers, and is perpetuated from age to age. (71)
The monsters he finds in the “depths of himself” are, as myth, part of a universal phobia
of the mysterious cosmos. Though Lovecraft is unique in the ways that he chooses to
represent and embody his anxiety, he acknowledges a common history of terror as he
writes that a general foundation of ever-present cosmic fear “has existed, and always
will exist.” As evidence of this collective angst, Lovecraft describes the inscrutable
impulse that drives writers such as himself to “try their hands at it in isolated tales, as if
to discharge from their minds certain phantasmal shapes which would otherwise haunt
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them”(Supernatural Horror 14). Lévy further speculates that Lovecraft was not merely
seeking to liberate himself from personal demons, but the process of writing horror, as
Artaud also suggests, is one of discovery and assigns signification to the “themes and
subjects corresponding to the agitation and unrest of our times” (80).
Lovecraft was, as we have seen, a man without hope. Unstable, sick,
unhappy, obstinately rejecting what he considered the delusions of faith,
fed on nihilistic philosophies, he had frequently thought of suicide. Only
his dreams—his correspondence testifies to it—permitted him to
overcome each crisis and to try once again to live. Did he not in dream
find, in the blackest moments, the unexpected help of secret and
vitalizing forces? We are then tempted to regard the Cthulhu Mythos,
whose elaboration was slow, progressive, and continuous, as the
adequate receptacle for the author’s anguish, where, in the waters of
dream, it could ”precipitate,” form deposits in precise, horrible,
monstrous shapes at the bottom of a structure ready to receive them and
give them meaning. Driven by myth [. . .] horror can only be expressed
by and in sacrilege: the impious cults, hideous ceremonies, blasphemous
rites elsewhere mentioned, which tell a reverse history of salvation. It is
at this deep level that the cure operates: because the sick man recognizes
these images of horror as his own, he is in a position to assume them
fully and thereby overcome them. To give a material representation to
anguish is in itself to be freed from it. [. . . ] For we can never totally
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invent our monsters; they express our inner selves too much for that.
(115)
By giving meaning to the “horrible, monstrous” shapes of the dark sublime, Lovecraftian
cosmic horror, then, may be seen as an attempt at re-signifying, or pre-signifying, the
“blank spots” of the numinous and inexplicable. Even if the attempt fails, as it always
does in Lovecraft story, the process remains therapeutic.
If Bloch and Lévy are right, and Lovecraft seeks to textually exorcise his demons
through his writing, then as the author and the intended target of the textual
inoculation, Lovecraft fills the roles of both inoculator and inoculatee. In a sense,
Lovecraft becomes the reader of his own text in order to tap into its inoculative process
and experience its therapeutic, cathartic power. By writing/reading his dramatic
encounter with trauma, Lovecraft can vicariously experience the trauma of his
characters via the structure of pre-memory. Keeping Kaplan’s logic in mind, we may
also infer that this purgation process can be completed not only by the one performing
the ritual—or, in other words, Lovecraft’s audience can also vicariously exorcise their
demons through the text. Just as Lovecraft creates and essentially role-plays his own
personal trauma through the medium of his fiction, so can we conclude that the reader
may vicariously experience some of his trauma through consumption of the text. Since
the methodology of Lovecraft’s personal inoculation is so well documented, the
remainder of this chapter will rhetorically analyze the typical strategies of his work
assuming that Lovecraft himself is the intended reader—with the understanding that
other readers may vicariously share in his experience.
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In order to successfully read Lovecraft as inoculative, one must first carefully
identify the specific type of inoculation for which his fiction is designed. Unlike de
Becker or Grossman, Lovecraft is not at all interested in saving people from attack and
does not care if his characters can physically defend themselves. Most of Lovecraft’s
encounters or altercations with malevolent entities prove fatal, and if they did not, it
was largely a matter of luck or hideous destiny leading only to madness or mutation.
Lovecraftian cosmic horror indeed operates according to the model of inoculative
nonfiction, but it is never physical survival that is the end goal. Not surprisingly,
Lovecraftian cosmic horror inoculates against the past, current, or future threat of
cosmic horror.
Trauma Inoculation in Lovecraftian Cosmic Horror
It is important to reaffirm at this point that any reading of Lovecraft as
inoculative is not mutually exclusive to its aesthetic appeal or related in any way to its
status in any canon. The logic of trauma inoculation suggests that under the right
circumstances, any instance of traumatic representation can and may serve to inoculate
its audience; this does not necessarily make the representation any more or less
legitimate in the eyes of fans or critics. Neither does this analysis seek to “redeem”
Lovecraft by offering a pragmatic reading of his ideology; Lovecraft needs no
redemption, and reading his work as inoculative is not intended as an act of
recuperation. What I will show is that this logic suggests that traumatic representation,
even in a form such as the fiction of Lovecraft, may result in symptoms of real trauma
that the reader—in this case, Lovecraft himself—can apply for inoculative purposes.
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Firefighters inoculate themselves against fire, and sailors inoculate themselves
against sinking ships; Lovecraft draws upon the logic of trauma theory and the concept
of pre-memory through his use of the exacerbation of textual trauma through
hyperdramatic narrative to inoculate against the unknown, or, more accurately, the
unknowable. The text inflicts trauma through Lovecraft’s signature blend of cosmic
horror that creates in the reader an “atmosphere of breathless and unexplainable dread
of outer, unknown forces.” Just as in inoculative nonfiction, the text strives for
plausibility. Though Lovecraft’s “daemons of unplumbed space” may seem the epitome
of implausibility, Lovecraft considered his style of writing to be much more believable
than “the literature of mere physical fear and the mundanely gruesome” (Supernatural
Horror 15). By relying on atmosphere and psychological terror, Lovecraft felt he tapped
into something much more real than anything an ostensible “realist” author could
achieve, and the artifices of fantasy he employed did not distract from his purpose.
Also, in a similar fashion to inoculative nonfiction, is Lovecraft’s preference for
the first-person voice for the purpose of adding to the perceived plausibility of the
account. Many of Lovecraft’s stories go so far as to provide a frame attempting to
create a fictitious history of the text itself. The most common frame is that of a diary.
Instead of an omniscient third-person narrator relating a story with no apparent
purpose than to amuse the reader, Lovecraftian fiction typically presents itself
documentary style. This textual-vérité encourages the possibility for the audience to
share in some of the trauma experienced by the storyteller. Most of Lovecraft’s fiction
adopts a structure of horrific discovery very similar to Grossman’s account of the U.N.
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Peacekeeper in the Congo: an unwitting protagonist stumbles upon a scene of
indescribable horror, and the narrator then describes the events in terrible, meticulous
detail. These details then serve to help the reader achieve a “veteran” status before
facing his own cosmic horror. The reader does not become a veteran of monsters,
though, but a pre-battle veteran against the “assaults of chaos”—the reader becomes
better prepared to deal with a cold, indifferent universe (Supernatural Horror 15).
Though Grossman calls the section in his book dealing with the U.N. peacekeeper a
study of “atrocity”—connoting something unnatural or “evil”—this word has less
meaning in the realm of Lovecraft’s cynical materialism where such religious-minded
distinctions are mostly useless. Notwithstanding, in a moment of linguistic desperation
it is not uncommon for a Lovecraftian narrator to refer to something as “blasphemous”
or as an “abomination.” Since cosmic horror has no adequate signifiers, the reader
witnesses the futility of human rationality and language, and it is this semiotic failure
that creates the true terror and inoculation.
By reading a Lovecraft story the reader preemptively encounters a hypothetical
situation where “human laws and interest and emotions have no validity or significance
in the vast cosmos at large” and, just as in Grossman’s text, the reader has the potential
to feel real trauma. In Grossman’s words, “Ultimately the purpose of this [technique],
and of this study, has been to look at the ugliest aspect of [cosmic horror], that we
might know, name it, and confront it” (On Killing 227). By re-signifying, or pre-signifying,
the numinous, or at least familiarizing the reader with its insignifyability, the text
prepares the reader for a similar encounter in the future. Just as Einstein and Darwin’s
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theories made Lovecraft feel that “there are no values in all infinity,” so does his horror
text create a pre-memory for and seek to pre-exorcise the ideological demon that “All
the cosmos is a jest, and one thing is as true as another” in advance for the reader. This
occurs not by banishing or denying it, but by embracing its reality and inescapability.
In terms of inoculation, Lovecraftian horror skirts the line between theoretical
efficacy—the more traumatic the better—and artistic pretention. As an author formally
devoted to the amateur writer movement, Lovecraft cared little for mainstream
audience approachability and sought only to perfect his art. Lovecraft could not
“discharge” from his mind the “phantasmal shapes which would otherwise haunt” him
through a text that was “mundanely gruesome,” and instead found success in the more
subtle atmospheric style he is now known for; he precisely tailored his personal vaccine
to his individual needs. Just as in its nonfiction counterpart, most of Lovecraft’s tales
inoculate by appealing to multiple levels of the continuum of trauma training efficiency.
The famous opening passage of “The Call of Cthulhu” presents a perfect example of this
in action; the story begins with an abstract theoretical principle, and the paragraph
offers a sort of warning—a declaration of that which the reader must inoculate against.
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human
mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance
in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should
voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have
hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of
dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of
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our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the
revelation or flee from the deadly light into peace and safety of a new
dark age. (130)
Table 3
Continuum of Trauma Training Efficiency and Lovecraft
Stage
1. Abstraction

Application in The Call of Cthulhu
“We live on a placid island of ignorance in the
midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not
meant that we should voyage far”

2. The Practical Example

Brief mention of Professor Angell’s death

3. Dramatic Narrative in Fiction

The sensationalized account of the encounter

in Film
4. High-Stress Live Drill

with Cthulhu et al.
(Hypothetical) Cthulhu: The Haunted House
Experience

For practical “textbook” examples Lovecraft casually describes several fictional scenarios
told in a third-person voice where people go insane following their encounter with
Cthulhu and its cult(ure). For example, the narrator briefly describes how Professor
Angell of Brown University dies suspiciously of what most think to be a heart-attack
after witnessing something cosmically horrific. The majority of the text describes in
thoroughly hyperdramatic fashion two major encounters with cosmic horror—including
an ill-fated face-to-face encounter with Cthulhu itself; Lovecraft seeks to exacerbate the
textual trauma of the reader and fills these moments with melodrama, disgusting details,
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and exclamation points. The story concludes with the first-person voice of the main
narrator who is now psychologically destroyed from all he has found: “I have looked
upon all that the universe has to hold of horror, and even the skies of spring and the
flowers of summer must ever afterward be poison to me” (158).
Lovecraft does not, of course, suggest the fourth stage—a high-stress live drill.
There are few—if any—suitable examples of training drills for the prevention of cosmic
horror in contemporary society, and if they do exist they would likely be even scarcer in
Lovecraft’s time; a trip to a spook-alley, magic-lantern show, or “haunted house,”
perhaps, being the only events even remotely similar for “live” participation available—
if these activities do indeed inoculate against such horrors as Lovecraft concerns his
fiction with. Just like a psychodrama session, the degree that a spectator “can enter
into the life upon the stage [. . .] is the measure of the catharsis he is able to obtain on
this occasion.” The more psychologically affective Lovecraft makes his fiction, the more
readers can “integrate” the text into their mind and inoculation occurs to a greater
degree.
Since the end goal of a Lovecraftian inoculation is to better prepare its author
and readers for the realization that “All the cosmos is a jest, and one thing is as true as
another,” and beyond that, to ensure the ability to successfully negotiate the event with
minimal subsequent psychological debilitation, Lovecraft’s fiction must actively enable
the reader to cope with this particular brand of trauma. Whereas inoculative nonfiction
enables its readers to kill or commit violence, Lovecraft must enable the reader to “kill”
or violently reject restrictive ideologies and all forms of humanocentrism. Eschewing
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“ignorance” and idealism for the capacity of cynical materialism, the text seeks safety
through the enabling of one’s personal potential for hopelessness: “there is nothing but
puerility in a tale in which the human form—and the local human passions and
conditions and standards—are depicted as notice to other worlds or other universes.”
For Lovecraft, the process of enabling is not just a secondary, back-up mechanic—it is
absolutely essential to the inoculation process.
A successful Lovecraft inoculation can only occur by preemptively rejecting
humanistic notions of philosophy and ethics can one hope to psychologically survive an
encounter with cosmicism. At the age of thirty-two he wrote “A Confession of Unfaith,”
which ostensibly illustrates a post-inoculation process Lovecraft who is now thoroughly
hardened and ready to face anything.
I no longer really desire anything but oblivion, and am thus ready to
discard any gilded illusion or accept any unpalatable fact with perfect
equanimity. I can at last concede willingly that the wishes, hopes, and
values of humanity are matters of total indifference to the blind cosmic
mechanism. Happiness I recongise [sic] as an ethical phantom who
simulacrum comes fully to none and even partially to but few, and whose
position as the goal of all human striving is a grotesque mixture of farce
and tragedy. (537)
This mentality significantly problematizes my discussion of pre-battle casualties in the
previous chapter; however, though Lovecraft writes consistently “unhappy” endings to
his stories, the hopelessness of the various scenarios are not so much an indication of
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the protagonists’ future success against attack, but it is the nature of the traumatic
ideology they must contend with. Lovecraft’s fiction suggests to his reader the idea that
“It’s hopeless!” is not what you should live in fear of, should you face an encounter with
cosmic horror, but the realization that “it’s hopeless!” and you do not stand a chance
against a cold, unfeeling cosmos is the precise ideology you need to thoroughly
internalize to escape mental debilitation. Just because one adopts a stance of
mechanistic materialism does not mean one cannot live a moderately happy and
ultimately fulfilling life. Thus, for Lovecraft, in order to become a pre-battle veteran of
cosmic horror, one must willingly despair and become what Grossman would consider a
pre-battle casualty. Even though Lovecraft’s characters always fail to survive their
encounters with cosmic horror, Lovecraft is a practical example of vicarious selfinoculation from their demise; by inoculating himself he managed to successfully
function in his system of beliefs and, through his writing and appreciation of art, found
sufficient reason to live and learn. Lovecraft even felt enough confidence to revel and
seemingly enjoy his position of unbelief. At the close of his celebratory manifesto on
weird fiction and the allure of the genre of cosmic horror Lovecraft scolds anyone who
would doubt his aesthetics: “Yet who shall declare the dark theme a positive handicap?
Radiant with beauty, the Cup of the Ptolemies was carven in onyx” (Supernatural Horror
106).
For the Lovecraftian text to successfully inoculate its readers, it must enable
them to jettison idealistic preconceptions of the universe, and the logic of trauma
inoculation suggests that this occurs in largely the same manner as inoculative
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nonfiction seeks to enable its reader to commit violence: the text tries to achieve this
rhetorically through accustomizing the reader to the rejection of humanocentric
ideologies and familiarizing them with positively-connoted examples of perceived
justifiable cynicism (see Table 4). Similarly, we can read that Lovecraftian fiction
presents a “boot camp for the psyche” where the audience reads again and again how
characters come to terms with, or fail to, instances of cosmic horror. Though survival is
never guaranteed, readers learns they must reject idealism and hope if they are to have
a chance of maintaining their sanity; the hyperdramatic narrative serves to reinforce the
inoculation, and any “real” trauma felt by the reader during or after consumption of the
text increases its efficacy.
Table 4
A Pedagogical Model of Lovecraftian Fiction
Rhetorical Strategy

Effect on Reader

Dramatic narration

Seizes the reader’s attention

Narration contains deliberately

Heightens the reader’s faculty of slightly

traumatizing material

scars the psyche

Exposition and analysis

Explores and explains cosmic horror to
prevent its future impact

The trauma vaccination conditions the

When the reader encounter “real” cosmic

reader and preemptively mediates

horror, the conditioning mediates the

future experience

experience in some way
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Once again, Lovecraft himself provides a practical example of this strategy in action.
Though he faced personal horror at the revelation of Einstein and Darwin’s theories, by
repeatedly snuffing out the lives and sanity of the straw-men in his fiction he managed
to embrace the unknowability of the universe enough to continue to function in life.
In his manifesto on weird fiction, Lovecraft adopts the artistic high-ground of a
pedantic curmudgeon and strict anti-didact: “We may say, as a general thing, that a
weird story whose intent is to teach or produce a social effect [. . .] is not a genuine tale
of cosmic fear” (Supernatural Horror 16). However, the fact that we can read a
“genuine” tale of supernatural horror to teach or produce a social effect need not in any
way detract from its status in the eye of its author, fans or critics. Recognizing how
Lovecraft draws upon the logic of trauma theory by inoculating his readers/himself via
the mechanism of pre-memory prompts us to rethink the social functions and impetus
for the popular demand of horror. Pre-memory allows us to better understand what
scholars, fans, and alarmists have tried desperately to explain for decades—why do
people seek out art-horror and how does it affect them?
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CODA: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INDENTIFYING PRE-MEMORY IN POPULAR MEDIA
So, here’s the map for the journey: We’ll start by putting our present
situation into the context of things we’ve experience in the past. Then I’ll
discuss how fear works—at its best and at its worst. With that foundation,
we’ll look at what you can do about *trauma+ and then study some of the
specific hazards we’re facing today. I’ll share ideas about how to get
information without being scared half to death in the process, and finally
we’ll look at some truths about human beings who act violently. If you
stay with me—through both the hard truths and the reassuring ones—I
feel certain you’ll be better prepared for the times ahead of us. *. . .+ Then
you can see if you reach the same conclusions I have: that you can find
your life in these times, that can influence your own safety, that you can
protect your country, that you can manage fear, and that you are going
to be alright. (de Becker Fear Less 21)
As de Becker points out, “In the satellite age, you see, we don’t experience just
the calamities in our own lives—we experience the calamities in everyone’s life. So
Americans have a far larger index of fears to draw upon” (Fear Less 48). The realization
of the massive volume of trauma distributed by the media demands that critics
acknowledge the need society feels to comprehend psychological suffering. Either as
victim or perpetrator, the utility of understanding violence and pain is at a premium,
and by exploring trauma theory and its sister disciplines (military science, psychodrama,
killology, and others), scholars can gather resources from a wide range of fields previous
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generations did not have access to. As a literary structure, pre-memory explains not
only how inoculative nonfiction and gothic texts claim to mediate their audiences future
behavior and experiences, but we can also apply the category of pre-memory as a lens
to explore texts far outside the realm of what we typically considered horror or horrific
texts.
Referring to the cultural “wound” delivered to New Yorkers by the September
11th attacks, Kaplan concludes her text, Trauma Culture, with the lines, “the residues of
the trauma that perhaps lay beneath the conflicts and tensions of rebuilding may be
lessening. We have begun to translate the trauma into a language of acceptance while
deliberately keeping the wound open; we are learning to mourn what happened, bear
witness to it, and yet move forward” (147). It would seem that many texts operate
under a similar banner to the one Kaplan raises for dealing with trauma. Since
inoculative nonfiction frequently justifies its existence through a connection with
children—we need to prepare ourselves so we can protect our kids; we need to make
sure we do not enable our kids to kill, and so forth—it seems useful to briefly examine a
pre-memory structure beyond the typical discussion of horror or gory shooter games.
Americans, for example, often teach their young children literacy from the fiction of the
much beloved Theodor Geisel, also known as Dr. Seuss. A fiery political cartoonist and
activist, many of his children’s texts directly implement the mechanism of pre-memory.
In one particularly violent book, I Had Trouble in Getting to Solla Sollew (1965), Seuss
hyperdramatically exposes his audience to the tale of a naïve, yet likeable gold-furred
animal on a visit to the titular city of Solla Sollew. While en route, various malevolent
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creatures repeatedly threaten, harass, and physically assault the timid creature. Failing
to reach his destination due to continuous “trouble,” the protagonist abandons his
journey and his current pacifistic ideology in favor of a plan that is much more cynical
and enabling:
Then I started back home
To the Valley of Vung.
I know I’ll have troubles.
I’ll, maybe, get stung.
I’ll always have troubles.
I’ll maybe get bit
By that Green-Headed Quail
On the place where I sit.
But I’ve bought a big bat.
I’m all ready, you see.
Now my troubles are going
To have troubles with me! (57)
The difference this time is that the protagonist now enables itself to commit violence.
Seuss textually translates the trauma of the journey, as Kaplan describes, into a
“language of acceptance”—which in this case is in the form of the rhetoric and visual
conventions of popular children’s literature. The text encourages the reader to forgo
repression or denial and deliberately keep its “wound open” in what it presents as a
seemingly healthy, acceptable way: the character briefly mourns its plight and current
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trauma, acknowledges the violence of the past, and then moves forward—now fully
enabled to deal with future trauma by any means necessary (it now carries a bat). The
text dramatizes, confronts, suggests a method of resolution for, and ostensibly invites
the reader to learn from and vicariously experience the pain of its protagonist.
It is not so much that I Had Trouble in Getting to Solla Sollew is an example of
watered-down, inoculative “horror” for kids. However, what I do propose is the fact
that Dr. Seuss, horror media, inoculative nonfiction, “reality” TV, the drama of tragedy
or cruelty, and many other texts operate similarly in their regular deployment of
rhetorical pre-memory structures, which suggests that the category of pre-memory is
nothing less than a fundamental building block of human pedagogy. Since fear, pain,
and death are the only truly universal human conditions, then it seems literary criticism
will never escape the compelling desire and emotional need to understand people and
confront their trauma. Though economists sometimes claim that all human interaction
falls under the umbrella of their discipline, perhaps the similar near-ubiquity of the
structure of pre-memory suggests that much of human learning falls under the field of
trauma studies—much more, perhaps, than most people would care to admit, lest they
be forced to face trauma they rather would repress. “Should you feel fear?” asks de
Becker, “The question is irrelevant, for there is no should about it. Of course you will
feel fear when there is reason to, like it or not. [. . .] Fear is, and is supposed to be. Start
there, accept it” (Fear Less 7-8). The potential for inoculation, via text or syringe, is all
around us; indeed, it is a foundational mechanic for the way we learn. And maybe, if we
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are lucky, then it will help us lessen or understand our own personal exposure to the
“residues of trauma.”
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